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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CHANNELING FOR
DIGITAL WORKS
Lucas S. Osbornt

Market economies are based on free competition, which can include copying.
Yet intellectualproperty protection in the United States prohibits copying in certain
circumstances to incentivize innovation and creativity. New breeds of digital works
are challenging our historicalapplicationof intellectual property law. These include
certain categories of software programs as well as digital manufacturingfiles. These
new works look deceptively like works from a previous era and thus, courts might
languorously treat them as they have older works. This would be a mistake. This
Article analyzes these works in terms of existing intellectual property doctrine and
constructs a normative framework for channeling the works among the different
intellectual property regimes and, in some cases, away from intellectual property
protectionaltogether.
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INTRODUCTION

Imagine you are a graduate student looking to make a little extra
money. Your entrepreneurial side awakens one day and you conceive of
a smart phone holder that will mount your phone to the air
conditioning vent in your car. Within a day, you create digital drawings
of the device in a computer-aided design and drafting (CAD) program,
and you translate that file into a three-dimensional (3D) printable
version. You 3D print the file, put it in your car, and are pleased to see it
works perfectly! You offer the file for sale on a popular 3D printing
website, and within days you enjoy modest sales totaling five hundred
dollars. Soon, however, the sales drop off. After searching the Internet,
you find your file-an exact copy-offered for free on a competing
website. What role, if any, does intellectual property (IP) law play in
preventing this copying? What role should IP play? This Article
addresses these questions for a variety of digital works.
Digital technology has intensely challenged the law, and IP is no
exception. The digitization of previously analog phenomena has
heralded perfect and costless copying and the abandonment of physical
artifacts such as CDs and DVDs. The digital era continues its
remarkable growth, so much so that we take for granted the range of
goods and services that are produced and delivered in digital form.
Music, television, and software reach us through various digital means,
including over the air, streaming, and digital delivery. We shop and
socialize in digital environments, and digitization increasingly impacts
fields as diverse as medicine and education.
Some digital works fit comfortably within an IP category. Digital
music and movies, for example, fit comfortably in copyright's sphere.
Others, after years of debate, are still unsettled. Application software, for
instance, was first granted copyright protection and denied patent
protection, then was granted patent and trade secret protection, and
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now suffers uncertainty as to the extent of its patent and copyright
protection.'
The continuing advance of digitization accelerates old questions
and brings new challenges to the IP regime. IP is largely about
incentivizing socially beneficial activity-creativity in the case of
copyrights and utilitarian inventions in the case of patents. 2 Assessing
digitization's challenges requires keeping one eye on incentives and the
other on the fundamental assumption of a competitive economy:
competition, including copying, is presumed permissible and
beneficial.3
The changing nature of creation and innovation complicates the
policy juggling. As highlighted by the introductory hypothetical, a new
breed of digital creations is forcing its way into the public sphere and
demanding judicial attention. These works consist of digital versions of
physical objects, sometimes called CAD files or digital manufacturing
files.4 These files in part resemble traditional blueprints or technical
drawings, but are imbued with vastly more potentiality in light of
various digital manufacturing devices such as 3D printers and computer
numeric control machines.
Other evidence of change can be seen with software programming
practices in an app-centered culture. As opposed to coding software
from scratch in a programming language, programmers can enjoy a
commoditized coding environment where icons represent subroutines.5
Rather than typing code as text, programmers rely on icons or default
structures to do much of the coding, with the programmer simply filling
in the blanks. As coding is abstracted and commoditized, and as simple
programs providing purely utilitarian functions proliferate, questions

1 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The Uneasy Case for Software CopyrightsRevisited, 79 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1746 (2011) [hereinafter Samuelson, Uneasy Case]; Jasper L. Tran, Two Years
After Alice v. CLS Bank, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 354, 356 (2016).
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
3 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001) ("In general,
unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be
subject to copying.").
4 See, e.g., Lucas S. Osborn, Regulating Three-Dimensional Printing: The Converging
Worlds of Bits and Atoms, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 553 (2014) (analyzing the impact of 3D
printing on various areas of law) [hereinafter Osborn, Bits and Atoms].
5 See, e.g., Build a Basic UI, APPLE DEVELOPER, https://developer.apple.com/library/
(last
content/referencelibrary/GettingStarted/DevelopiOSAppsSwift/BuildABasicUI.html
updated Dec. 8, 2016) ("Xcode provides a library of objects that you can add to a storyboard
file. Some of these are elements that appear in the user interface, such as buttons and text fields.
Others, such as view controllers and gesture recognizers, define the behavior of your app but
don't appear onscreen.").
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resurface as to whether the resulting software meets copyright law's
modicum of creativity threshold.6
Digitization portends increased innovation and creativity at
relatively low costs. It is also full of opportunity for sharing and copying
creations. Some will view the sharing as a good thing, but others will
resist their works being copied. Still others will be willing to share but
will desire some measure of control over downstream uses, such as
requiring attribution or forbidding commercialization of any
adaptations. IP law represents a key mechanism through which creators
can potentially enjoy a measure of control over their creations.
But how (and whether) IP applies to emerging digital works has
proven problematic. The literature has begun to explore this issue from
a doctrinal perspective, but some of it is confused or simply incorrect.
Moreover, there is a dearth of holistic analysis regarding how various IP
strands-including copyright, patent, design patent, trademark, and
trade secret law-apply to these new digital works doctrinally and
normatively. This Article supplies that analysis and provides
provocative conclusions: IP law applies less than many believe, and its
incentive is less necessary than many would expect.
Part I of this Article describes digital creations that are disrupting
the IP regime. Part II analyzes how IP doctrine, especially patent and
copyright law, applies to these creations. After clarifying misconceptions
in the literature regarding copyright protection for purely utilitarian
digital works, the Part provides a key insight-many, if not all, of these
files will lack the necessary creativity to qualify for copyright protection.
This contentious proposition draws upon recent literature exploring the
boundaries of copyright's creativity threshold.7
Part III removes the confines of doctrine to assess normatively
whether and what types of IP protections are optimal. The analysis
primarily follows the American tradition of utilitarian analysis in IP law,
supplemented by insights from sociology and the psychology of
innovation incentives. This Part explains why, perhaps surprisingly,
many modern digital works will require relatively minor IP incentives.
Digital technology decreases the costs of many creations, resulting in a
6 The creativity requirement is found within copyright law's requirement of originality.
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
7 See, e.g., Justin Hughes, Size Matters (or Should) in CopyrightLaw, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
575 (2005); Justin Hughes, The Photographer'sCopyright-Photographas Art, Photograph as
Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 374-75 (2012) [hereinafter Hughes, Photograph as
Database]; Edward Lee, Digital Originality, 14 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 919, 928-30 (2012);
Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOzO L. REV. 451 (2009). An early, prescient
exploration of IP, creativity boundaries, digitization, and even CAD files can be found in J.H.
Reichman, Electronic Information Tools-the Outer Edge of World Intellectual PropertyLaw, 17
U. DAYTON L. REv. 797 (1992).
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proportionally smaller need for traditional IP protections. Whereas
courts have stubbornly protected traditional software through
copyright, in part for historical reasons and in part based on ontological
fixations, this Article shows how and why to channel certain works away
from copyright's sphere. These works represent a reductio ad absurdum
of the sometimes tenuous proposition that utilitarian software code has
copyrightable expression. Protecting these works with copyright would
be a misapplication of the law and would impede innovation.
Conversely, the Article describes how patent law will often underprotect
digital files of new and nonobvious inventions.
The Article demonstrates that many files will not need or receive
patent or copyright protection, but rather should be channeled to other
legal and nonlegal mechanisms that provide adequate appropriability
mechanisms. The mechanisms vary depending on the type of file and
the seller's business model, but trademarks, trade secrets, and especially
contracts can play a role. Outside of the legal sphere, technological
protection measures and first-mover advantages provide additional
means to leverage a financial return. Part III concludes by criticizing
attempts by creators to append copyrightable matter to otherwise
unprotected files; a type of "lockout code." Courts should recognize
these lockout codes as backdoor attempts at patents and refuse to
enforce them.
The overall analysis seeks to balance competition policy, thus
contributing to the ongoing discussion about the proper scope of the
public domain.8 Innovation and creation are cumulative, with each new
advance building off that which came before it. Blithely applying IP
protections to digital works without careful attention to each creation's
nuances risks overprotection, which in turn stifles innovation. At the
same time, leaving creations too vulnerable to copying likewise
dampens innovation. This Article provides the approach for a proper
balance.
I.

DIGITAL MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY AND DIGITAL WORKS

3D printing (also called additive manufacturing and rapid
prototyping) has exploded into the public's consciousness in the last five
years, spurred by technological advances, reduced costs, media

&

8 See, e.g., Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965 (1990); Kal Raustiala
Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion
Design, 92 VA. L. REv. 1687 (2006); Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617 (2008).

1308

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39:1303

attention, and investment opportunity.9 Numerous commentators have
explained the technology o and explored its legal implications,11 but
much work has yet to be done.
It has quickly become general knowledge that 3D printers take
instructions from so-called CAD files that contain all the information
needed to manufacture a physical object. Computer numerical control
(CNC) machines operate on a similar principle-using CAD-type files
as digital inputs-but instead of additively building up an object's layers,
they cut, drill, or otherwise remove material from an existing object
until obtaining the desired shape. 12
Although the legal literature often labels the digital inputs for
digital manufacturing processes as "CAD files," that is an inexact term.
It can refer to files that assist in drawing or manipulating objects in a
CAD environment, such as DWG files, that may never be used for 3D
printing. I refer to these files as "design files." Creators can convert
design files into a format suitable for digital manufacturing, such as

STL, 3MF, and AMF for 3D printing,13 and STEP files for CNC
manufacturing.14 I call these files "manufacturing-ready" files, and they
are the format most often transferred, shared, and sold on sites like
thingiverse.com.15 Software translates manufacturing-ready and design
files into a third group of files that can speak essentially directly to the
manufacturing device (e.g., a 3D printer).16 Examples include any of the
9 See, e.g., HOD LIPSON & MELBA KURMAN, FABRICATED: THE NEW WORLD OF 3D

PRINTING (2013); A Third Industrial Revolution, ECONOMIST (Apr. 21, 2012), http://
www.economist.com/node/21552901.
10 For a description of the technology, see LIPSON & KURMAN, supra note 9. See also Lucas
S. Osborn et al., A Casefor Weakening PatentRights, 89 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1185 (2015).
11 See, e.g., Nora Freeman Engstrom, 3-D Printing and Product Liability: Identifying the
Obstacles, 162 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 35 (2013) (discussing the possible impact of 3D printing
on the future of products liability law); MICHAEL WEINBERG, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, IT WILL BE
AWESOME IF THEY DON'T SCREW IT UP: 3D PRINTING, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND THE
FIGHT OVER THE NEXT GREAT DISRUPTIVE TECHNOLOGY 12 (Nov. 2010), https://

www.publicknowledge.org/files/docs/3DPrintingPaperPublicKnowledge.pdf; Osborn, Bits and
Atoms, supra note 4 (analyzing the impact of 3D printing on various areas of law).
12 See ADRIAN MCEWEN & HAKIM CASSIMALLY, DESIGNING THE INTERNET OF THINGS 154-

68 (2014).
13 See What Is 3m]?, 3MF CONSORTIUM, http://3mf.io/what-is-3mf (last visited Mar. 7,
2018); see also TJ McCue, STL Files: What They Are and How to Use Them, LIFEWIRE, https://
www.lifewire.com/stl-files-2255 (last updated Dec. 13, 2017). An STL file approximates a threedimensional shape's surface with a collection of nested triangles. Id.
14 See STRATASYS, INC., BEST PRACTICE: CONVERTING CAD TO STL (2015),

http://

www.stratasys.com/-/media/Main/Files/Best-PracticesBP/BPDUCADtoSTL_EN_1115.ashx
(describing file conversion); The STEP Standard,STEP TOOLS, INC., http://www.steptools.com/
library/standard/step_4.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
15 3D Printing, THINGIVERSE, https://www.thingiverse.com/explore/newest/3d-printing
(last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
16 See Bob Warfield, Secrets of Goingfrom CAD, Image, DXF, or STL to GCodefor CNC and
3D Printing, CNC COOKBOOK, http://www.cnccookbook.com/secrets-going-cad-image-dxf-stl-
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GCODE file types. GCODE files provide instructions to the machine
about where to move, how fast, and when,17 and thus must include
information about the specific digital manufacturing machine. 18 I refer
to this group of files as machine-instruction files, although they should
not be confused with machine-language (e.g., ones and zeros), which is
what computers translate machine-instruction files into. 19
Throughout this Article, I apply the generic label "digital
manufacturing file" to any file that can, without human intervention,
provide manufacturing instructions to a relevant machine. Importantly
for later analysis, any digital manufacturing file can be depicted as an
image on a computer screen. It can also be depicted as "code," either
higher-level computer programming language or machine-language
(essentially zeros and ones). Below is an excerpt of code from a GCODE
file for a simple washer20:
G1 Z15.0 F9000 ;move the platform down 15mm

092 EO
01 F200 E3
092 EO
01 F9000

;zero the extrided length
;extrude 3mm of feed stock
;zero the extruded length again

;Put printing message on LCD screen

Ml 17 Printing...
;Layer count 12

;LAYER-O
M107

00 F9000 X58.549 Y59.387 ZO.300
G61 FISO0 X591715 Y58.239 EO3847
01 X60.945 Y57.153 E0.07706

01 X62.234 Y56.138 EO.11563
01 X63.575 Y55.196 F0.15417
01 X65.099 Y54.246 E0.19639
A user can also obtain digital manufacturing files from existing
repositories on the Internet2l or can use a 3D scanner to create a digital
file of an existing physical object.22 The user can modify, share, or sell
gcode-cnc-3d-printing (last visited Mar. 7, 2018); McEWEN & CASSIMALLY, supra note 12, at
165.
17 See Bob Warfield, 3D Printing 101: Part 4: Software, CNC COOKBOOK, http://
www.cnccookbook.com/3d-printing-101-part-4-software (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
18 Id.

19 See, e.g., How Coding Works, CODE CONQUEST, http://www.codeconquest.com/what-iscoding/how-does-coding-work (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
20 I thank Professor Joshua Pearce of the Michigan Technological University for providing
this code. In the code, the text following each semicolon on a given line constitutes a comment
that has no effect on the file's functionality. A user types the comments, which can include
whatever the user wants, including fanciful or creative text.
21 See, e.g., 3D Printing,supra note 15.
22 See, e.g., Rachel Feltman & Christopher Mims, 3D Scanners Are Getting Cheap So Fast,
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them. These files cause indigestion for IP owners who feel largely
powerless to stop the digital proliferation of files they perceive to
infringe their IP.23
Traditional application software represents another set of digital
works that perpetually challenges IP paradigms.24 Programmers have
traditionally written code in higher-level programming languages called
source code. When the source code is complete, computers translate it
into object code, a machine-readable language often depicted in ones
and zeros.
New methods of programming will stress the limits of IP law.
These programming environments are increasingly modularized and
abstracted. The "programmer" does not directly type code, but rather
selects icons that represent functions25 or selects from default structures
based on commonly used features.26 The user then fills in certain
parameters to actuate the function for her particular need. The use of
modules, objects, and established subroutines are not at all new to
computer programming, of course. 27 But their graphical representation
and use in increasingly short utilitarian programs highlights how little
authorship occurs at the textual level. As will be seen, modular and
abstracted approaches to programming stress certain assumptions
regarding the applicability of IP to programs.
II.

DOCTRINAL PROTECTIONS

In a perfect world perhaps, one would place works into either a
creative basket for copyright protection or a utilitarian basket for patent

the Age of 3D Piracy Could Soon Be upon Us, QUARTZ (Aug. 15, 2013), http://qz.com/115824/
3d-scanners-are-getting-cheap-so-fast-the-age-of-3d-piracy-could-soon-be-upon-us; Adam P.
Spring, David Laser Scanner Offers DIY, Low-Cost 3D Recording Solution, NEW ATLAS (Aug. 12,
2012), https://newatlas.com/laser-3d-recording-david-laser/23676.
23 See U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROP. ENF'T COORDINATOR, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
2013 JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 6 (June 2013),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/IPEC/2013-us-ipec-jointstrategic-plan.pdf ("[J]ust as 3D printing offers the opportunity to make meaningful
contributions to our society, there also exists the opportunity for individuals who look to
exploit others' hard work to abuse this technology by trading in counterfeit and pirated goods,
of which we must be cognizant and diligent in our efforts to prevent."); Press Release, Gartner,
Gartner Says Uses of 3D Printing Will Ignite Major Debate on Ethics and Regulation (Jan. 29,
2014), http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2658315 ("Gartner predicts that by 2018, 3D
printing will result in the loss of at least $100 billion per year in IP globally.").
24 See, e.g., Samuelson, Uneasy Case, supra note 1.
25 See Build a Basic UI, supra note 5 (discussing Xcode).
26 See, e.g., RUBY ON RAILS, http://rubyonrails.org (last visited MAR. 7,2018).
27 See, e.g., Modular Programming, TECHOPEDIA, https://www.techopedia.com/definition/
25972/modular-programming (last visited Mar. 7, 2018).
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protection. Many digital works fit nicely into one category, such as
movies in copyright. But others are not so easy. This Part analyzes
difficult-to-categorize digital creations and provides insights into how
existing IP doctrines apply to these works. Courts and commentators
often assume that copyright applies to virtually any digital file, so the
bulk of this Part presents my controversial proposition that copyright
will not protect a significant and identifiable subset of digital files. This
Part also analyzes other legal protections.
A.

Copyright Law: MissingCreativity and Using Lockout Codes

Copyright law protects creative, as opposed to utilitarian works.
Eligibility for copyright protection requires the work to be original to
the author, meaning not copied and containing a modicum of
creativity.28 Most sculptures, paintings, novels, and movies all easily pass

the creative threshold.
Software has had a more difficult time finding acceptance in the
copyright regime, in part because programs' functional aspects limit
creativity. Since the 1960s, though, software has been strong-armed into
copyright law's sphere. The original rationale was that because
programmers write software in programming languages, the resulting
text constitutes a literary work like writing a novel.29 This thinking,
never easily accepted because of software's strongly functional nature, 30
always included a proviso that the software code must contain creativity
in its expression.31 But this proviso has often been ignored by courts and

28 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) ("[T]he requisite
level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works
make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, 'no matter how crude, humble
or obvious' it might be." (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON

COPYRIGHT § 2.01 (rev. ed. 1990))).
29 See NAT'L COMM'N ON NEW TECH. USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 16

(1978).
30 The literature on software copyright is voluminous. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Tailoring
Legal Protectionfor Computer Software, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1329 (1987) (arguing for sui generis
protection for programs); A. Samuel Oddi, An Uneasier Case for Copyright Than for Patent
Protection of ComputerPrograms,72 NEB. L. REV. 351 (1993) (arguing that programs should be
protected by patent law, not copyright law); J.H. Reichman, Computer Programs as Applied
Scientific Know-How: Implications of Copyright Protection for Commercialized University
Research, 42 VAND. L. REV. 639 (1989); Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308 (1994) (critiquing copyright
protection of software and arguing for sui generis protection for programs).
31 See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667
(noting that copyright protects computer programs only "to the extent that they incorporate
authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas
themselves").
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commentators who eschew an inquiry into the creativity of code,32
perhaps hypnotized by copyright law's historical ontological fixations.33
Sometimes an extended inquiry into creativity is unnecessary, as
when the program or file34 is complex and open to many creative,

alternative approaches. Files that clearly contain creativity include those
whose outputs constitute creative works, such as a digital manufacturing
file for a creative sculpture or an app that will produce a creative
audiovisual output. The copyright statute specifically lists "pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works" (PGS works) and "audiovisual works" as
protectable.35 In the nonintuitive language of the statute, a digital
manufacturing file or an app is a "copy" of a "work." The statute defines
copies as "material objects ... in which a work is fixed by any method
now known or later developed, and from which the work can be
perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device."36
32 Much judicial analysis of software simply presumes that copyright protects the verbatim
code and turns its focus to whether copyright protects non-literal elements (the structure,
sequence, and organization) of the program. See, e.g., Comput. Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, 982 F.2d
693, 702 (2d Cir. 1992) ("It is now well settled that the literal elements of computer programs,
i.e., their source and object codes, are the subject of copyright protection." (citations omitted));
Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int'l, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 78, 91 (D. Mass. 1992) ("Rather, the central
point is that because courts are bound by the congressional mandate that something in
computer programs is copyrightable, I must reject Borland's premise."); Apple Comput. Inc., v.
Formula Int'l, Inc., 562 F. Supp. 775, 781 (C.D. Cal. 1983) ("It is crystal-clear that CONTU
recommended that all computer programs, fixed in any method and performing any function,
be included within copyright protection. There likewise can be no doubt but that Congress
accepted that recommendation and embodied it in the 1980 amendments to the Copyright
Law."), affd, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984); cf Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339,
1356-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding Oracle's declaring code to constitute copyrightable subject
matter unaffected by merger or scenes a faire). Other commentators are more nuanced. See
Pamela Samuelson, Functionality and Expression in Computer Programs:Refining the Tests for
Software Copyright Infringement, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1215, 1238 n.130 (2016) [hereinafter
Samuelson, Functionality]("Occasionally, a program may either have insufficient originality to
support a copyright or be rendered unprotectable because function and expression have
merged.").
33 See Lloyd L. Weinreb, Copyright for Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. REv. 1149,
1184-1210 (1998) (describing how certain works were protected merely because they fell within
a certain category).
34 Before proceeding with the analysis, it will be useful to highlight the breadth of the
copyright statute's definition of a "computer program." U.S. copyright law defines "computer
program" as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer
in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). This definition includes not
only application programs like Microsoft Word, but also what people colloquially call files, such
as digital manufacturing files. I will follow this definition and will use the terms "software" and
"file" interchangeably with "program."
35 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5). PGS works "include two-dimensional and three-dimensional
works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps,
globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans." 17
U.S.C. § 101.
36 17 U.S.C. § 101 (emphasis added).
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This definition maps perfectly onto digital manufacturing files that
will print a creative sculpture: the sculpture is "fixed" in computer
memory 37 and can, "with the aid of a machine" (e.g., a 3D printer) be
"perceived" (i.e., printed without human intervention other than
pushing the "print" button). Thus, the files constitute copies of the
sculpture.38 The same is true for an app that produces, via a computer, a
creative audiovisual output. 39

It is a central thesis of this Article, however, that many digital
manufacturing files and other simple software files fall within that
"narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking
or so trivial as to be virtually nonexistent."40 Even if some files contain
slight creativity, the creativity "merges" with the utilitarian function or
idea of the object or program. 41 As such they cannot enjoy copyright
protection.
1.

Files Lacking a Modicum of Creativity

At the other end of the extreme from files that 3D print creative
sculptures are files whose outputs are purely utilitarian in nature. 42
These include digital manufacturing files that will make unadorned

37 See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 441 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that
audiovisuals are "fixed" in a "memory device"); Apple Comput., Inc. v. Franklin Comput.
Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3d Cir. 1983) ("Therefore we reaffirm that a computer program in
object code embedded in a ROM chip is an appropriate subject of copyright.").
38 Commentators evidence some confusion on this topic. See Lucas S. Osborn, The Limits of
Creativity in Copyright: DigitalManufacturingFiles and Lockout Codes, 4 TEX. A&M J. PROP. L.
REV. 25, 36-39 (2017) [hereinafter Osborn, Limits of Creativity] (describing erroneous analyses
in the literature). Whether design files constitute copies of sculptural works is a little less
straightforward because many design files require human alteration before a computer can use
them for digital manufacturing and the design file is not tessellated. See id. The derivative
works category would apply if the differences are material. Further, despite some confusion in
the literature, there is no need to analyze whether the digital file-as a digital file-has
utilitarian aspects that might render it a "useful article" under 17 U.S.C. § 101. Id. at 39-41. The
"useful article" referred to by section 101 is only the underlying physical object, not the file. Id.
39 See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
40 Feist Publ'ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359 (1991).
41 I will not discuss merger separately in depth in this Article. A valuable and
comprehensive analysis of the doctrine can be found in Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing
Copyright's Merger Doctrine, 63 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 417 (2016). Within Professor
Samuelson's typology, digital manufacturing files would fit into cases using "[m]erger and
[o]riginality" and "[m]erger and Section 102(b) [f]unctionality [e]xclusions" to deny copyright
protection. Id. at 450-51. But the files discussed herein do not need to rely on merger and can
instead be denied protection based solely on lack of creativity.
42 There is a middle category for physical objects-objects containing a mixture of
utilitarian and aesthetic features. These are only copyrightable if the creative aspects are
separable from the utilitarian aspects. See, e.g., Star Athletica, L.L.C. v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137
S. Ct. 1002 (2017).
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screws, shovels, or engine parts, and apps that perform purely useful
functions like pinch-to-zoom on a smart phone. For reasons discussed
below, these files do not qualify for copyright protection, although each
will get multiple bites at the apple.43
Purely utilitarian digital manufacturing files will no longer fall
within the definition of copies of a sculptural work. Instead of
producing artistic sculptures, they produce purely utilitarian objects,
which constitute "useful articles"" with no separable creative features.45
Hence, the files are not copies of any protectable sculptural work.
Likewise, a purely utilitarian app will no longer constitute a copy of an
audiovisual work, because it does not produce a creative output.
Nevertheless, each file gets another chance at copyright protection.
For instance, the digital manufacturing file may be a copy of a
protectable pictorial/graphic work because it can depict the object on a
computer screen. After all, the statute specifically includes "technical
drawings" in the list of PGS works.46 The two-dimensional
representation of a utilitarian object might qualify as a copy of a
technical drawing. Moreover, both the manufacturing file and the
utilitarian app might be protected as creative literary works since the
files can be depicted as programming code.47
That the same file can potentially represent a variety of protected
categories (sculpture, drawing, and literary work) illuminates an
undertheorized doctrinal phenomenon in copyright law that gives some
things-here, digital files-multiple bites at the apple of copyright
protection. We do not afford other things, notably machines, the same
luxury.48 Machines in operation are purely functional and receive no
copyright protection. But machines in stasis (and also in motion) could
be seen as sculptures. To police the boundary between patent law and
copyright law, copyright protection is not available for machines despite
this dual nature. 49 With computer programs, though, copyright law
potentially protects them even though in operation they, like machines,
43 For a more robust discussion demonstrating the lack of copyright protection for digital
manufacturing files for purely utilitarian objects, see Osborn, Limits of Creativity, supra note
38, at 41-59.
44 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function
that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.").
45 See id. (stating that "the design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be
considered a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified separately
from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the article").
46 Id.

47 Osborn, Limits of Creativity, supra note 38, at 52-56.
48 Professor Weinreb is one who has noted and explored this phenomenon. Weinreb, supra
note 33, at 1176-93; see also Reichman, supra note 7, at 802-06.
49 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (delineating the lack of protection for useful articles).

2018]

IP CHANNELING

1315

are purely functional.so Whatever the justification for the disparate
treatment of digital versus physical works, to enjoy copyright protection
the pictorial/graphic work (i.e., the technical drawing) or the literary
work must constitute an original work of authorship that includes some
modicum of creativity.51
The requirement for creativity precludes copyright protections for
digital manufacturing files for purely utilitarian objects as either
technical drawings or literary works. First, consider the files as technical
drawings. As I have explained elsewhere, not all technical drawings
(whether paper or digital) contain creativity.52 Traditional drawings
contain creative decisions as to which views to show, which parts to
label, etc., 5 3 but digital manufacturing drawings do not contain such
choices.54 Every detail in the digital manufacturing drawing exists to
manufacture a precise utilitarian object-it is the equivalent of tracing.
There is no coloring, shading, or perspective (the CAD program by
default makes the object view rotatable). Unlike an artist who paints a
landscape in as exact detail as possible, the CAD designer does not leave
her "personal reaction [as] an individual"55 in the drawing. What she

50 Weinreb, supra note 33, at 1153 ("In their operational form, programs are strictly
functional and contain no expression. . . .").
51 See, e.g., Feist Publ'ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (explaining
that originality requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity); J.H. Reichman,
Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2477
(1994) [hereinafter Reichman, Legal Hybrids] ("Technical [d]rawings, [b]lueprints, and
[e]ngineering [p]rojects. . . 'constitute some of the oldest and most instructive marginal cases
in the intellectual property universe.'").
52 See Lucas S. Osborn, Of PhDs, Pirates, and the Public: Three-Dimensional Printing
Technology and the Arts, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 811, 829 (2014) ("Of course, technical drawings
can be copyrighted only to the extent they contain some minimal creativity."); Osborn, Limits
of Creativity,supra note 38, at 42-52.
53 See Axxiom Mfg., Inc. v. McCoy Invs., Inc., 846 F. Supp. 2d 732, 748 (S.D. Tex. 2012)
(holding that a CAD drawing showing an exploded view of a valve contained enough
nonmerged creativity "[bjecause more than one way exists in which to create an exploded-parts
drawing of the ... valves"); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 2A.14[B] (rev. ed. 2017) (noting that a drawing of an uncopyrightable object may be
copyrightable because of "the original elements of perspective, angle, and the like that the artist
employed in depicting the toy in two-dimensional illustrated form" and noting that
noncopyrightable elements include "the structure and appearance of the toy itself").
54 See generally Osborn, Limits of Creativity, supra note 38, at 31-34, 47-48 (explaining in
detail how digital manufacturing drawings are created and why they lack creativity).
55 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 249-50 (1903). One
commentator argues that manufacturing files for printed circuit boards should enjoy copyright
protection because the designer could arrange the components and conductively connect them
in numerous ways. See John R. Ackermann, Toward Open Source Hardware,34 U. DAYTON. L.
REV. 183, 199-202 (2009). This analysis ignores the fact that the designer is making choices that
directly reflect the make-up of a physical circuit board, which is not copyrightable as a useful
article. The author also argues that the physical circuit board is copyrightable. Id. at 203-04.
But this is surely erroneous. Just because there are multiple ways to design a utilitarian circuit
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draws corresponds directly and exactly to the utilitarian object to be
manufactured. There is one-and only one-way to depict a shovel of
given dimensions; the length and shape of the handle and spade must
correspond exactly (though perhaps at scale) to the tangible shovel. Like
those maps and databases devoid of creativity,56 these files sit outside of
copyright protection.
The court in EnterprisesInternational,Inc. v. InternationalKnife
Saw, Inc.57 understood the creativity requirement when it refused
copyright protection to the plaintiffs' technical drawings because the
"designs admittedly contain[ed] only functional and utilitarian
information, the sole purpose of which [was] to manufacture specific
types of knives or blades to precisely fit certain machines. .. ."58 The
court's language is arguably too broad because utilitarian information
creatively arranged can be protected, but the thrust of the opinion aligns
with the requirement for creativity.
With digital manufacturing drawings it may be true that minor
decisions regarding the order of the manufacturing process (e.g., start
manufacturing on the left or the right side of the object, or drill the left
hole first) comprise "creative" decisions, but it is not at all clear that
these minimal variations cross into the realm of copyrightable
expression. The vast majority of potential decisions (e.g., orient the
object lengthwise or widthwise) will be dictated by utilitarian
concerns, 59 and what remains is so banal as to lack meaningful
board does not make it copyrightable. Were it otherwise, all shovels would be copyrightable
because there are multiple utilitarian designs for shovels.
56 See, e.g., Feist, 499 U.S. at 347-48 (stating that collections of data are only copyrightable if
creativity is used in the selection and arrangement); Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 286-87 (4th
Cir. 2007) (affirming the Copyright Office's refusal to register preexisting map with additions
"color, shading, and labels using standard fonts and shapes"); Kern River Gas Transmission Co.
v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458, 1463-64 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he idea of the location of the
pipeline and its expression embodied in the 1:250,000 maps are inseparable and not subject to
protection."); see also Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright in Electronic Maps, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 395
(1995) (noting that the Feist decision leaves many digital maps unprotected by copyright).
57 No. C12-5638 BHS, 2014 WL 1365398 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 7, 2014).
58 Id. at *6. Apparently relying on the plaintiffs own admission, the court did not provide a
detailed analysis, nor did it provide a copy of the drawing at issue (probably because it was also
claimed as a trade secret). Id.
59 And for that reason cannot constitute copyrightable expression. See, e.g., Richard H.
Stern, Legal Protection of Screen Displays and Other User Interfacesfor Computers: A Problem in
BalancingIncentives for Creation Against Need for Free Access to the Utilitarian, 14 COLUM.VLA J.L. & ARTS 283, 333-34 (1990) ("That there is more than one way to do something does
not mean that some ways will not be better than other ways. Interpreting copyright law to
protect better methods against unauthorized use turns copyrights into patents without the
safeguards and limitations of the patent system."). Further, manufacturing-ready and machineinstruction files are overwhelmingly created from design files exclusively by computer
programs using utilitarian rules, rendering any slight variations in the resulting file
uninfluenced by the design drawing creator. See Osborn, Limits of Creativity, supra note 38, at
27-28.
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Were it otherwise, accounting forms such as those in Baker
v. Selden would have received copyright protection as pictorial or

creativity.60

graphic works.61

A recent controversial case from the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit also demonstrates that digital drawings lacking creativity
will not receive copyright protection. In Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota
Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc.,62 the court held that Meshwerks' digital model
of a Toyota car could not enjoy copyright protection.63 Meshwerks
created initial drafts of the drawings using actual measurements from
existing cars, and then its "personnel fine-tuned or, as the company
prefers it, 'sculpted,' the lines on screen to resemble each vehicle as
closely as possible."64 The court confusingly focused on Meshwerks'
copying of the physical car, deeming the final model not to be
independently created.65 Although that reasoning is suspect if the court
meant that realistic depictions of objects cannot be copyrighted, the
result is likely correct because the model lacked any protectable
creativity.66 For example, the court highlighted that "Meshwerks did not
make any decisions regarding lighting, shading, the background in front
of which a vehicle would be posed, the angle at which to pose it, or the
like

.

...

"67

One may attempt to distinguish Meshwerks because that case
involved the copying of an existing object, whereas a digital
manufacturing drawing may be created before the tangible object exists;
but this distinction is without significance when focusing on creativity.
All would agree that creating a purely utilitarian object from a
traditional drawing (e.g., a sketch that is protected by copyright by
virtue of perspectives or the like) results in no protectable creativity for
the tangible object.68 As Professor Nimmer explains in the context of a
noncopyrightable toy:
60 See Weinreb, supra note 33, at 1159 n.32 ("But the expression, even in a flow chart, is
banal and unoriginal, and of no value.").
61 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104-07 (1879) (holding that forms used to implement an
accounting system were not protected by copyright).
62 528 F.3d 1258 (10th Cir. 2008).
63 Id. at 1269-70.
64 Id. at 1260.
65 Id. at 1263-69. Professor Ed Lee criticizes the court's failure to recognize the difference
between copying a copyrighted "work" versus an uncopyrighted object from the world. Lee,
supra note 7, at 928-30. But the court is best understood as equating the employee's work to
slavish copying (e.g., mere tracing), which does not involve creativity, as opposed to an artist
painting a nature landscape, which does.
66 See Meshwerks, 528 F.3d at 1265-67.
67 Id. at 1265. The court continued, stating, "in short, its models reflect none of the
decisions that can make depictions of things or facts in the world, whether Oscar Wilde or a
Toyota Camry, new expressions subject to copyright protection." Id.
68 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012); Lamb v. Grand Rapids Sch. Furniture Co., 39 F. 474,
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[T]he only copyrightable elements contained in the copyrighted
illustration are the original elements of perspective, angle, and the
like that the artist employed in depicting the toy in two-dimensional
illustrated form. One who reproduces the toy in three-dimensional
form, by hypothesis, does so by copying from the illustration only the
noncopyrightable elements-the structure and appearance of the toy
itself-without copying the copyrightable elements, such as the
lighting and particular perspective that go into depicting the toy in
two-dimensional form.69
Notice the only protectable aspect of the traditional drawing to
which Professor Nimmer points are things like lighting, perspective, and
angle. None of these things exist in most digital manufacturing
drawings because the drawing is generic regarding angle-the view is by
default rotatable and thus has no fixed angle or perspective. He correctly
indicates that the structure and appearance of the object are
noncopyrightable elements. Digital manufacturing files, particularly
STL and GCODE files, generally contain nothing but functional
information as to the structure and appearance of the physical object.
These manufacturing drawings can be analogized to Platonic
"forms," which Plato argued were the most accurate reality even though
they were nonphysical.70 Like Plato's forms, digital manufacturing files
are akin to mathematical formulae that define abstract versions of
tangible objects.71 And we can think of digital files as "real" versions of
tangible objects as Plato saw forms as the real versions of tangible
objects.72 The analogy is not perfect, and few today operate under a
belief in Plato's forms, but it helps to see how in a world of 3D printing
it makes little sense to treat digital manufacturing files of utilitarian
objects differently from the tangible object. To do so would be to protect
functionality.
Aside from potential protection as technical drawings, digital
manufacturing files might qualify for copyright protection as a literary
work because they can be represented in textual (code) form. This
avenue is complicated by the fact that digital manufacturing file creators
typically do not write in a programming language. Rather, they draw the
picture in a CAD environment, often using stock shapes and objects

475 (W.D. Mich. 1889) (allowing the defendant to make copies of the plaintiffs
noncopyrightable furniture and then to create drawings of those copies without infringing
plaintiffs copyrights in drawings of the same furniture).
69 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 53, § 2A.14[B].
70 See, e.g., JOHN M. FRAME, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY 64-65
(2015).
71 See id. at 64.
72 See id.
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that they manipulate into the specific size needed.73 The CAD
environment thus abstracts the coding one or more levels above the
literal code, rendering the literal code something that is not authored
directly by the programmer. 74 Further, the CAD program writes the text
algorithmically, presumably based purely on utilitarian considerations,
thus leaving no creativity in the particular textual choices.75 In effect, the
CAD environment renders every copyright analysis of digital
manufacturing files a question as to whether the structure, sequence,
and organization of the files contain protectable expression. If so, the
only potential creativity in the text will flow, if at all, from the order in
which the creator drew the object.76 Once again, these miniscule choices
are too small to cross the admittedly low threshold of creativity.
The lack of protection for other types of digital files likewise
demonstrates the noncopyrightability of digital manufacturing files for
utilitarian objects. Take for example a noncopyrightable photograph.
Courts and commentators agree that some photographs, such as slavish
copies of public domain works, lack any creativity.77 If a physical copy of
a photograph is not protected by copyright it must follow that a digital
copy of that photograph would not be protected either. Even though a
JPEG file is a "computer program" (per the copyright statute's
definition)78 and can be represented in code format, this cannot
transform it into a protectable work. The file's code is written by a
digital camera. And even if a person set out to recreate the photograph
on a computer pixel-by-pixel, the person exhibits no creativity by
merely copying the pixels. Analogously, a digital manufacturing file of a
utilitarian object exhibits no protectable creativity.
Consider also digital files for typeface fonts (a stylized set of
characters such as Times New Roman), a phenomenon that came to the
73 See, e.g., CAD Blocks, AUTODESK, http://www.autodesk.com/solutions/cad-blocks (last
visited Mar. 8, 2018).
74 Cf Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703-12 (2d Cir. 1992)
(assuming that the literal code, which the programmer drafted, was protectable, and
implementing an abstraction-filtration-comparison test to test what else, if anything, was
protectable).
75 See Osborn, Limits of Creativity, supra note 38, at 53-55.
76 The order will presumably be reflected in the design drawing file. But upon conversion to
a manufacturing-ready file, such ordering may be replaced by an algorithmically determined
order. Id. at 54-56.
77 See Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519 (7th Cir. 2009) (recognizing
that there exists a "narrow category of photographs that can be classified as 'slavish copies,'
lacking any independently created expression"); Bridgeman Art Library, Ltd. v. Corel Corp., 36
F. Supp. 2d 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A ComparativeAnalysis of
the Notion of Originality in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 949, 956-57 (2002)
("[A] photographer trying to take a technically perfect picture is not making creative choices[.]"
(emphasis in original)); Hughes, Photograph as Database, supra note 7, at 374-81.
78 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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fore with the personal computer era. 79 Courts and lawmakers regard
most printed typeface fonts as too functional to merit copyright
protection.80 Once font designers digitized the fonts, however, a new
debate kindled as to whether the digital files that would display the fonts
might be copyrightable as literary works or compilations.s
The Copyright Office initially rejected claims to copyright
protection for the files, finding they lacked creativity as mere
transformations of analog characters into digital versions.82 It reasoned
that, "[b]ecause the typefont data is determined by the ultimate shape of
the typeface character, and requires de minimis, if any, selection and
arrangement, it does not qualify as a compilation or any other original
work of authorship."3 The analogy to digital manufacturing files is
clear. The physical utilitarian object is not copyrightable just like the
utilitarian written letters of a font. Likewise, the digital manufacturing
file is dictated entirely by the need to create the specific utilitarian
object, just as the basic image of the font is dictated by the need to create
a specific character. Thus, the digital file lacks creativity.
But the typeface debate took an abrupt turn soon after the 1988
Policy Decision. Under intense lobbying from typeface protectionists,
the Copyright Office eventually issued a regulation that, although not
recanting its 1988 Decision, clarified that certain font files, such as
scalable font files, could receive copyright protection. 84 The arguments
in favor of copyrightability distinguished the primitive bitmapped font
79 See generally Phillip W. Snyder, Typeface Design After the Desktop Revolution: A New
Case for Legal Protection, 16 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 97 (1991). I credit Aaron Perzanowski
for pointing out the analogy to typeface.
80 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 55-56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659 ("The
Committee has considered, but chosen to defer, the possibility of protecting the design of
typefaces... .The Committee does not regard the design of typeface, as thus defined, to be a
copyrightable 'pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work' within the meaning of this bill and the
application of the dividing line in section 101."); Monotype Corp. PLC v. Int'l Typeface Corp.,
43 F.3d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that "typefaces are not afforded copyright protection").
Though this position is not without detractors. See Terrence J. Carroll, Protectionfor Typeface
Designs: A Copyright Proposal, 10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 168-82
(1994) (arguing in favor of copyright protection for typeface designs); Jacqueline D. Lipton, To
@ or Not to @? Copyrightand Innovation in the Digital Typeface Industry, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
143, 151-55 (2009) (discussing dissenting views).
81 See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 80, at 172-73; Snyder, supra note 79, at 110-15.
82 See Policy Decision on Copyrightability of Digitized Typefaces, 53 Fed. Reg. 38,110,
38,112 (Sept. 29, 1988) ("The Copyright Office concludes that typefaces created by a
computerized-digital process are also uncopyrightable. Like analog typefaces, digitally created
typefaces exhibit no creative authorship apart from the utilitarian shapes that are formed to
compose letters or other font characters.").
83 Id. at 38,112.
84 Registrability of Computer Programs That Generate Typefaces, 57 Fed. Reg. 6201, 6202
(Feb. 21, 1992) (codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 202) ("[T]he Copyright Office is persuaded that
creating scalable typefonts using already-digitized typeface represents a significant change in
the industry since our previous Policy Decision.").
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files85 and stressed the arguably creative decisions designers made when

creating fonts, such as selecting points along curves to approximate the
shape of characters, which can be grown or shrunk by increasing or
decreasing the distance between the points.86 Although the Copyright
Office agreed that such creative choices can render some font files
copyrightable (and some courts have agreed),87 it continued to stress
that that "digitized typeface as typeface is unregistrable .... 8
Even so, the rationale that supports protections for some font files
(however dubious in terms of meaningful creativity) does not support
protection for digital manufacturing files. Unlike the font designers who
define shapes by hand-selecting points along characters' curves, digital
manufacturing file creators generally rely on computer programs to
draw the shapes and lines.89 It is true that the creator may need to
produce a custom shape, but that shape will correspond directly to the
shape of the physical object. Thus, digital manufacturing files are more
akin to nonprotectable bitmap font files than scalable font files. Of
course, modern manufacturing files are easily scalable, but not based on
any action of the digital file creator-the CAD or other program has
scalability "built in."
Turning from manufacturing files to utilitarian programs like a
pinch-to-zoom app, these files can also be represented in textual form
and thus might be protected as literary works. Unlike with most
manufacturing files, though, programmers traditionally have typed (or
pasted) most of the lines of code for application programs. In part
because of the loose parallel between writing a book and coding a
program, courts have indulged Congress's prescription that literal code
is typically copyrightable, albeit with "thin" protection.90 But even as to
literal code, works must contain a modicum of creativity. 91 If every line
85 In a bitmap file, a particular character is defined by selecting all the dots on a screen that
are needed to produce the character; it is essentially redrawing the character exactly. See Blake
Fry, Why Typefaces Proliferate Without Copyright Protection, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
425, 438 (2010).
86 See id. at 437-39; cf Adobe Sys., Inc. v. S. Software, Inc., No. C 95-20710 RMW (PVT),
1998 WL 104303, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 1998) ("Adobe contends that while the shape of the
glyph necessarily dictates some of the points to be chosen to create the glyph, it does not
determine all the points to be chosen. Thus, each rendering of a specific glyph requires choices
by the editor as to what points to select and where to place those points.").
87 See Adobe Sys., Inc., 1998 WL 104303, at *5.
88 Registrability of Computer Programs That Generate Typefaces, 57 Fed. Reg. at 6202.
89 See Osborn, Limits of Creativity, supra note 38, at 50-52.
90 See Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702, 711-12 (2d Cir. 1992) ("It
is now well settled that the literal elements of computer programs, i.e., their source and object
codes, are the subject of copyright protection.") (responding to arguments that the resulting
protection is too thin).
91 See H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667
(noting that copyright protects computer programs only "to the extent that they incorporate
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of code is dictated by efficiency or dictated by external factors, there is
no protectable expression.92
Beyond the limits of hand-typed code, new practices are
challenging copyright's d6tente with code. Indeed, programmers now
can code using stock subroutines represented graphically in a manner
loosely resembling a CAD environment.93 Thus, the programmer does
not write much of the code's text-the layer of software that courts
generally see as the most deserving of protection.94 instead, the
programmer simply chooses an icon representing a function she desires
to include. A program translates that icon into code, presumably
according to utilitarian rules. Just as with digital manufacturing files, as
computer application programming becomes automated and
modularized, serious questions arise as to whether purely utilitarian
programs are copyrightable.95
These programs begin to look more and more like simple recipes,
which are not copyrightable.96 Perhaps the programmer could exchange
the order of certain subroutines, but are such simple choices enough to
overcome the modicum of creativity requirement? If simple ordering
choices could constitute sufficient creativity, then even simple listings of
ingredients would qualify for copyright protection. After all, one could
list flour first and eggs second or vice versa. One could alphabetize the
ingredients or organize them by weight. And yet, we are told that mere
listings of ingredients are not copyrightable.
Again, one could frame this issue in terms of merger rather than a
complete lack of creativity.97 In some cases merger may be the
appropriate doctrine, but it has its drawbacks. Most notably, some
jurisdictions apply it only as an affirmative defense, which leads to
unnecessary uncertainty and litigation costs. 98

authorship in programmer's expression of original ideas, as distinguished from the ideas
themselves").
92 See Comput. Assocs. Int'l, 982 F.2d at 707.
93 See, e.g., Build a Basic UI, supra note 5 (describing Xcode).
94 See Comput. Assocs. Int'l, 982 F.2d at 702.
95 I exclude from this analysis programs containing creative output as they will be
protectable as audiovisual works.
96 See 37 C.F.R. § 202.1(a) (stating that "mere listing of ingredients or contents" are not
copyrightable). Further, even inclusion of simple instructions for mixing the ingredients does
not make the recipe copyrightable because it is merely a functional system or process. See
Tomaydo-Tomahhdo, L.L.C. v. Vozary, 629 F. App'x 658, 661 (6th Cir. 2015); Lambing v.
Godiva Chocolatier, No. 97-5687, 1998 WL 58050 (6th Cir. Feb. 6, 1998); Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd. v.
Meredith Corp., 88 F.3d 473, 480-81 (7th Cir. 1996); Lapine v. Seinfeld, No. 08 Civ.
128(LTS)(RLE), 2009 WL 2902584 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2009).
97 See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Reconceptualizing Copyright's Merger Doctrine, 63 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 417 (2016).
98 Id. at 437-38.
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Increasingly then, certain digital files present fundamental
copyright eligibility issues. If we take the requirement of creativity
seriously, basic digital manufacturing files of purely utilitarian objects
and relatively short applications, especially those programmed in
graphical environments, are not copyrightable. These digital works
present in starker form the longstanding discomfort with copyright
protection for computer programs. 99 Importantly, however, the
copyrightability issues discussed herein are not simply matters of
congressional intent. On the contrary, the Feist Court presented its
modicum of creativity test as a constitutional requirement flowing from
the Intellectual Property Clause.oo
2.

Appending Creativity as Lockout Codes to Circumvent Feist

Creators will often want copyright protection for their files and if
those files do not inherently contain sufficient creativity, their creators
may seek to add ancillary copyrightable aspects to the files. They would
do so solely to attempt to protect the otherwise uncopyrightable file.
How will users accomplish this, and how might courts approach such
behavior?
Essentially any file's code can include nonexecutable statements
called comments. A user can take advantage of this feature by inserting
arbitrary creative comments into the file to append copyrightable
expression.ol For example, a user might insert a creative and original
poem in the comments. 102 Alternatively, users of digital manufacturing
files can overlay an otherwise uncopyrightable digital object with a

99 See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 33, at 1160 (stating that computer programs present the
issue of "whether a functional work may be copyrightable subject matter. As far as programs
are concerned, Congress had said yes. Perhaps long-accepted copyright principles said no").
100 Feist Publ'ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) ("Originality is a
constitutional requirement.").
101 A user could, of course, also insert comments for practical purposes, such as explaining
to others the author's thought process in organizing the file. Whereas comments can be
important for lengthy application programs, they will likely be rare in digital manufacturing
files, which are primarily drafted not in text form but in CAD drawing environments. Minimal
comments might not be copyrightable. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d
675 (1st Cir. 1967) (holding that any possible expression in a text describing the rules of a
contest had "merged" with the idea because there were only a small, finite, and limited number
of ways to express the idea of such a contest).
102 A company performed a similar trick by embedding an original haiku into the header of
outgoing emails as part of a spain prevention system. See Tarah S. Grant, Habeas Haiku
Splatters Spam, INTA BULL. (Int'l Trademark Ass'n, New York, N.Y.), (July 1, 2003), http://
www.inta.org/INTABulletin/Pages/HabeasHaikuSplattersSpam.aspx; John Leyden, Habeas Sues
Haiku Abusers, REGISTER (Apr. 4, 2003, 3:51 PM), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2003/04/04/
habeas-sueshaikuabusers.
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copyrightable image. 103Either scenario will render the file, as a whole,
potentially protected by copyright. Although only the expressive aspects
are protected from copying, a user wanting to obtain the file cannot
selectively copy only portions of the file.
In these scenarios, the expressive content acts as a lockout code,104
attempting to limit the public's access to utilitarian, noncopyrightable
aspects of the files. The user does not want or care about the expressive
content but will be forced technologically to copy it to obtain access to
the utilitarian content. Indeed, the user will likely discard (in the case of
images) or be unaware of (in the case of comments) the creative content.
Lockout codes are not new. 05 In other instantiations, creators
typically used them to prevent interoperability between a creator's
system or hardware and a competitor's follow-on products.106 In those
cases, the competitor was not seeking to unlock a file simply for the sake
of copying the file (copyright law precluded verbatim copying), but
instead wanted access to a system so that the competitor could
independently create competing products like video games or printer
cartridges. In contrast, a user seeking to circumvent the lockout codes
described herein wants to copy the file directly and may not
independently develop anything. 107
Doctrinally, courts can respond in a variety of ways to these uses of
nonexecutable comments and creative image overlays. First, courts can
treat the copyrightable expression as protected and find anyone who
copies it a prima facie infringer. A court might feel comfortable with
this approach by noting that nothing in copyright law prevents an
imitator from independently creating his own utilitarian digital
manufacturing file or app. 0 8

103

The user could also put the creative image off to the side of the utilitarian object but still

within the file. See MICHAEL WEINBERG, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, WHAT'S THE DEAL WITH

COPYRIGHT AND 3D PRINTING? 16 (Jan. 2013), https://www.publicknowledge.org/files/What's%
20the%2ODeal%20with%2OCopyright_%20Final%20version2.pdf.
104 Cf Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineeringand the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual
Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1094-97 (1995)
[hereinafter Cohen, Reverse Engineering] (discussing lockout programs that limit access to
video games without a key, wherein the key consists of copyrighted material); Andrea Pacelli,
Who Owns the Key to the Vault? Hold-Up, Lock-Out, and Other Copyright Strategies, 18
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1229, 1242-46 (2008) (discussing the use of
copyrighted material as a password for access to a computer program or other proprietary
source).
105 See Cohen, Reverse Engineering, supra note 104; Pacelli, supra note 104.
106 See Samuelson, Functionality,supra note 32, at 1221.
107 In this sense, courts may be more likely to look down on the circumventer as a "freerider." Whether this is an appropriate approach is considered in Part III.
10 A third party can always independently create a drawing or file of an uncopyrighted
physical object. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903)
("Others are free to copy the original [if it is not protected by copyright]. They are not free to
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Second, courts may find that the lockout code's expression merges
with its function.109 Merger typically applies where expression is
minimal, but lockout codes may be highly creative. Nonetheless, courts
have been categorically unsympathetic to lockout codes, and a court
may find that any expression-no matter its length-merges with the
overarching function as a lockout code.110 Such an approach would
provide a bright-line rule for follow-on users of digital files, allowing
them to create copies of the files without worry.
If a categorical merger approach is too blunt an instrument, more
finely tuned tools exist. With computer programs, fair use can preserve
"public access to the ideas and functional elements embedded in
copyrighted computer software programs.""'
Fair use can serve as a
defense to infringement when users copy lockout codes solely for access
to the utilitarian aspects of the file.112
The copyright statute lists several factors courts must balance to
determine whether an otherwise infringing use is excused.113 As to the
first factor, even though some users may copy the file to manufacture
objects and sell them for profit (or sell the files directly), this will not
necessarily weigh against fair use. The user will be profiting from the
utilitarian aspects of the file, not its creative aspects, and the copying of
copy the copy."); Lamb v. Grand Rapids Sch. Furniture Co., 39 F. 474, 475 (W.D. Mich. 1889)
(allowing defendant to make copies of plaintiffs noncopyrightable furniture and then to create
drawings of those copies without infringing plaintiffs copyrights in drawings of the same
furniture). In addition, the copyright in a technical drawing does not extend to the right to
manufacture the utilitarian object depicted therein. 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2012) ("This title does
not afford, to the owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful article as such, any greater
or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or display of the useful article so
portrayed than those afforded to such works under the law, whether title 17 or the common law
or statutes of a State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held applicable and construed by a
court in an action brought under this title.").
109 Cf Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 541 (6th Cir.
2004) ("[T]he fact that [the expression] also functions as a lock-out code undermines the
conclusion that Lexmark had a probability of success on its infringement claim.").
110 Id. at 544 ("[A] poem in the abstract could be copyrightable. But that does not mean that
the poem receives copyright protection when it is used in the context of a lock-out code.").
111 Sony Comput. Entm't, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596, 603 (9th Cir. 2000).
112 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 544-45 (discussing how the use of a program as a lockout code
can affect the fair use analysis in favor of fair use); cf Chamberlain Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (refusing to allow a DMCA claim to eviscerate a fair use
defense); Connectix, 203 F.3d at 602-08 (finding that intermediate copying of BIOS that was
necessary to access unprotected functional elements of video game console constituted fair use);
Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1520-28 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding
intermediate copying to understand video game compatibility with game console to be per se
fair use); Cohen, Reverse Engineering,supra note 104, at 1104-51.
113 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (listing as nonexclusive factors "(1) the purpose and character of
the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work").
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the creative aspects will often be entirely incidental.114 Regarding the
second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work, the copyrighted work
is undoubtedly expressive in one sense, but its use as a lockout code can
militate in favor of fair use.1 15
The third fair use factor looks at how much protected expression
the copier takes, and here by necessity the defendant takes the whole of
the expressive lockout code. Although copying a whole work normally
weighs against fair use, in this context it may be of little or no weight
because the amount taken is analyzed in light of the lockout nature of
the work.116 Finally, the fourth fair use factor looks at the effect of the
use upon the potential market for, or value of, the copyrighted work.
Courts analyzing lockout codes tend carefully to distinguish between an
effect on the market for the utilitarian work versus an effect on the
market for the copyrighted expression-only the latter is relevant to the
fair use analysis."t7 Almost by definition, the copyrighted expression has
limited or no market significance because almost any user would be
happy to avoid copying it altogether. Thus, courts have found that the
fourth factor weighs in favor of fair use.118
Besides merger and fair use, a court unfavorably disposed toward
lockout codes can apply the doctrine of copyright misuse. Whereas fair
use protects against infringement on a case-by-case basis, the doctrine
of copyright misuse can render a copyright unenforceable against all, at
least until the misuse is purged.119 Copyright misuse is an equitable
114 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 544 ("In copying the Toner Loading Program into each of its
SMARTEK chips, SCC was not seeking to exploit or unjustly benefit from any creative energy
that Lexmark devoted to writing the program code. As in Kelly, SCC's chip uses the Toner
Loading Program for a different purpose, one unrelated to copyright protection."); Kelly v.
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 818-19 (9th Cir. 2003) (determining that commercial use did
not weigh against fair use where it was "more incidental and less exploitative in nature" because
the copies were used for a different purpose from the originals).
115 See Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526 ("Because Sega's video game programs contain unprotected
aspects that cannot be examined without copying, we afford them a lower degree of protection
than more traditional literary works.").
116 See id. at 1526-27 (finding that the wholesale copying weighed against fair use, but
because the copying was incidental to accessing utilitarian aspects of the program, "the factor is
of very little weight"); Cohen, Reverse Engineering, supra note 104, at 1124-25 (arguing that
copying a whole work to gain interoperability should not weigh against fair use); cf. Pierre N.
Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1122-24 (1990); Lloyd L. Weinreb,
Commentary, Fair'sFair:A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1146
(1990).
117 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 544-45 (focusing only on the market effect for the expressive
portion of the work and not on the market for the utilitarian aspects); Connectix, 203 F.3d at
607 ("Sony understandably seeks control over the market for devices that play games Sony
produces or licenses. The copyright law, however, does not confer such a monopoly.").
118 See Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 545.
119 See, e.g., Alcatel U.S.A., Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772 (5th Cir. 1999) (extending
copyright misuse to a license that required licensees to agree not to create competing software);
Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med. Ass'n, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997) (same); Lasercomb
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doctrine and typically involves instances of anticompetitive behavior
that violate antitrust laws, but "[t]he question is not whether the
copyright is being used in a manner violative of antitrust law ... but
whether the copyright is being used in a manner violative of the public
policy embodied in the grant of a copyright."20 Commentators have
argued that courts should apply misuse more broadly, including in the

context of lockout codes. 121
I reserve a normative discussion of how courts should respond to
these lockout codes for Section III.C. For now, the Article turns to a
doctrinal assessment of patent protection for digital works.
B.

Patent Law

Patent law protects new and nonobvious utilitarian inventions.
Unlike free and automatic copyright protections, patent applications
undergo extensive examination and cost several thousand dollars. And,
unlike copyright's permissive scope, patents protect only a modest
subset of purely utilitarian design files because patent law requires
novelty and nonobviousness. 122 Known or obvious variations on known
objects, like a basic hammer or toothbrush holder, will not be
patentable.
Patents are very technical documents, and the language of the
patent claims governs the scope of the right to exclude. 123 Patent law's
insistence on tying protection to what is claimed poses problems for
inventions of devices that can be digitally manufactured. If a patent
contains claims directed only to the physical embodiment of the
invention, such a claim likely will not provide any direct protection to a
digital manufacturing file of the device.124 For example, a claim to a
"motor" does not cover a "file that will manufacture a motor."

&

Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 979 (4th Cir. 1990).
120 Lasercomb, 911 F.2d at 978.
121 See, e.g., Brett Frischmann & Dan Moylan, The Evolving Common Law Doctrine of
Copyright Misuse: A Unified Theory and Its Application to Software, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
865, 912 (2000) (arguing that "copyright misuse is an appropriate judicial mechanism for
restricting the social costs of granting copyrights on functional innovations"); Karen E.
Georgenson, Reverse Engineeringof Copyrighted Software: Fair Use or Misuse?, 5 ALB. L.J. ScI.
TECH. 291, 312-13 (1996) (supporting copyright misuse defense for necessary intermediate
copying and any derivative uses); Kathryn Judge, Note, Rethinking Copyright Misuse, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 901 (2004).
122 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03 (2012).
123 See SRI Int'l v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 75 F.2d 1107, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("It is
the claims that measure the invention.").
124 See Timothy R. Holbrook & Lucas S. Osborn, DigitalPatent Infringement in an Era of 3D
Printing,48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1319, 1353-56 (2015).
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Using a 3D printer to print a patented device constitutes direct
infringement of the patent claim covering the physical object. 125 Direct
infringement is patent law's strongest form of protection. Making,
using, selling, and offering to sell the claimed invention will constitute
direct infringement. 126 Direct infringement exists regardless of whether
the infringer knows of the patent or intends to infringe.
Practically, however, direct infringement claims based on physical
"makings" will be difficult to pursue in a world of mature digital
manufacturing technology.127 Would-be infringers can obtain digital
manufacturing files on the Internet largely anonymously, and even if
they are discovered, the patent holder would face the additional hurdle
of proving that they actually printed the files.128 Even where the
infringement is discovered, patent holders will find it inefficient to sue
individual infringers rather than the traditional high-volume,
centralized manufacturer.129 Likewise, many would-be infringers will

not sell and offer to sell physical embodiments of the invention, but only
digital versions.
Patent owners would thus prefer to control the digital
manufacturing files directly. As Tim Holbrook and I explored in other
work, courts could extend current doctrines to cover "digital patent
infringement," particularly when the infringer sells or offers to sell a
digital file. We singled out the actions of selling and offering to sell
because those acts appropriate the economic value of the invention.130
We were more circumspect regarding whether acts of making and using
digital versions of the claimed invention should be actionable because of
practical consequences and the effects on follow-on innovation.131 Until
courts adopt our proposal or something similar, patent claims covering
physical objects offer only modest direct protection with respect to
digital files.

125 Id. at 1332.
126 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
127 See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 124, at 1332-69.
128 Id. Copyright decisions debate the right of distribution in roughly related contexts. See,
e.g., Elektra Entm't Grp., Inc. v. Barker, 551 F. Supp. 2d 234 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (holding that an
offer to distribute a file, as opposed to actual distribution, on a P2P network can infringe the
distribution right); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp. 2d 153 (D. Mass. 2008)
(holding that when a file is made available on a P2P network, distribution (download) by third
parties is presumed, and the accused must rebut the presumption). Contra PAUL GOLDSTEIN,
GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 7.5.1 (3d ed. 2005) ("The crux of the distribution right lies in the
transfer ... of a copy or phonorecord. . . . [A]n actual transfer must take place; a mere offer of
sale will not infringe the right.").
129 See Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 124, at 1332-69.
130 Id. at 1353-64.
131 Id. at 1364-67, 1377-84.
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Of course, even if a patent claim to the physical embodiment
cannot give rise to successful direct infringement claims, a patent owner
can still assert indirect infringement claims. These claims, however,
suffer from serious limitations. Foremost is the requirement that the
infringer have knowledge of the patent and an intent to infringe it. 132
Moreover, the patent owner must identify acts of direct infringement,
which can be difficult as mentioned previously. Thus, indirect
infringement doctrines offer only modest protection.
Given the difficulties with claims directed to physical objects,
inventors could seek patent claims directed to the file itself. This strategy
appeals not only to inventors of digitally manufacturable items, but also
to inventors of software-based inventions. Any patent claims drawn to
digital files, however, run into difficulties because one cannot patent an
abstract idea.133
Although the abstract idea exclusion was a stumbling block to early
software patent applications, software patents were relatively easy to
obtain in the 1990s and 2000s. But the Supreme Court initiated a
monumental shift toward software patents with its decision in Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank International.134Jasper Tran reports that as of the
decision's two-year anniversary on June 19, 2016, "courts have
examined 568 challenged patents brought under [section] 101 motions
citing Alice, resulting in 190 valid patents and 378 patents invalidated
with an average invalidation rate of 66.5%. The Federal Circuit has
upheld [three] patents and invalidated [thirty-four] patents-an average
invalidation rate of 91.9%."135 The vast majority of the patents affected
by Alice are software-related inventions, and as of June 19, 2016 (the
two-year anniversary of Alice), the Federal Circuit had only upheld two
software-related inventions.1 36 One of these cases, Enfish, L.L.C. v.
Microsoft Corp.,137 involved patent claims that specifically improved a
computer's functionality, 138 a type of claim that has long been patentable
even in Europe and that will not assist patent claims discussed in this
Article. Intriguingly, between June 19, 2016 and March 13, 2017, the
Federal Circuit has issued several decisions upholding patent validity in
the face of an abstract idea challenge, four of which were softwarerelated. 139
132 See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011).
133 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
134 Id. at 2352 (holding that a method of intermediated settlement was not patent eligible
even if computer implemented).
135 Tran, supra note 1, at 356.
136 See id. at 364.

137 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
138 Id.

139 See Thales Visionix Inc. v. United States, 850 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (finding claims
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After Alice, the landscape for software-related patents is at best
uncertain and at worst bleak. Obviously, if patents are largely
unavailable for software-type claims, inventors of the type discussed in
this Article do not have many options. Perhaps, though, the recent
potential trend toward finding software claims eligible may signal hope
for these inventors.
Even if these patent claims face a more receptive future, it is not
clear how much protection inventors will enjoy from claims directed to
digital manufacturing files. One cannot patent a file in the abstract.140
The traditional way to claim a computer file in a non-abstract way has
been to use the Beauregardclaim format,141 which recites a "computer
readable medium" (e.g., a CD or other computer memory) containing
the computer program. Even assuming such claims could survive after
Alice,142 they offer inventors only limited protection because they are
tied to a tangible storage medium.143
Specifically, a claim to a tangible storage medium containing a
specific file is only infringed by one who makes, uses, sells, or offers to
sell, etc., a tangible storage medium so programed.144 While it is true
non-abstract that were directed to an inertial tracking system (e.g., accelerometers and
gyroscopes connected to a computer) for tracking the motion of an object relative to a moving
reference frame); Amdocs (Isr.) Ltd. v. Openet Telecom, Inc., 841 F.3d 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(finding not abstract a Beauregard-style claim); McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games Am. Inc.,
837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding not abstract a claim directed to automated 3D
animation speech method that used unconventional rules that relate sub-sequences of
phonemes, timings, and morph weight sets); Rapid Litig. Mgmt. v. CellzDirect, Inc., 827 F.3d
1042 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (upholding hepatocyte preparation method); BASCOM Glob. Internet
Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility L.L.C., 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (finding, for the purposes
of 12(b)(6), the patent claims provided a solution for filtering content by installing a filter on an
Internet service provider's servers in a non-abstract way). Between March 2017 and the time
this Article was headed to print, the Federal Circuit issued several additional decisions
favorable to software patents. See, e.g., Core Wireless Licensing S.A.R.L. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 880
F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Finjan, Inc. v. Blue Coat Sys., Inc., 879 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
Moreover, two of the cases held that genuine factual issues subsumed within the patent
eligibility analysis may preclude dismissal at the pleadings stage or the grant of summary
judgment. Aatrix Software, Inc. v. Green Shades Software, Inc., 882 F.3d 1121, 1126-30 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (holding that factual allegations precluded Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal); Berkheimer v.
HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1369-70 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that summary judgment was
improper due to genuine issues of material fact).
140 See Digitech Image Techs., L.L.C. v. Elecs. for Imaging, Inc., 758 F.3d 1344, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2014) ("Data in its ethereal, nonphysical form is simply information that does not fall
under any of the categories of eligible subject matter under section 101.").
141 This name derives from the eponymous case that signaled an endorsement of the format,
In re Beauregard, 53 F.3d 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
142 As the author was writing this Article, the Federal Circuit upheld a "Beauregard" claim in
Amdocs, 841 F.3d 1288. But they still face an uncertain future. See Daniel Harris Brean,
PatentingPhysibles: A FreshPerspectivefor Claiming3D-PrintableProducts, 55 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 837, 845 (2015) (noting the claims are "are increasingly scrutinized for abstractness").
143 See Brean, supra note 142, at 845-46.
144 Id.
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that one who makes a copy of the file and stores it on her computer
infringes the claim by "making" the invention, this only constitutes a
single act of infringement.145 Single acts of infringement give rise to
relatively small damages, and though they give the patent holder a
chance to obtain an injunction, injunctions are expensive to obtain and
are not automatically granted.146
The patent holder would prefer to capture sales and offers to sell
the invention, but when an accused party puts a file on the Internet for
sale, she is not selling the tangible storage medium, and thus is not
infringing the claim directly. 147 Moreover, in a digital world of costless
copying, many people will not even bother to charge money for the file
they have made available on the Internet, thus avoiding infringement
for "selling" and "offering to sell" the invention. 148
Additionally, Beauregardclaims may offer insufficient protection if
they only protect machine-instruction files. Recall that digital
manufacturing files come in at least three types. The design file (e.g.,
DWG file) constitutes a drawing for the object that must be converted
to a manufacturing-ready file (e.g., STL file), which in turn must be
converted into a machine-instruction file (e.g., GCODE). Clearly the
machine-instruction file would qualify as instructions for making the
object, but the manufacturing-ready file is less clear, and the design file
even less so. 149 If design files and manufacturing-ready files are not
covered by Beauregardclaims, competitors will be able to trade in them
with relative impunity from direct infringement.150
In conclusion, patent law currently offers uncertain prospects for
the protection of digital files. Even if the files are protectable, current
patent claim formats offer less than equal protection when compared to
claims to physical objects.
C.

Other Modes of Protection

Utility patents and copyrights are not the only forms of protection.
The IP doctrines of design patents, trademarks, and trade secrets can
offer some control to creators of digital works. In addition, creators can
reach outside of IP law and use contract law and technological

145
146
147

Id. at 846.
Id.
Id.

148 Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 124, at 1363-64.
149 See Brean, supra note 142, at 847-48.
150 Though they could still be guilty of indirect infringement
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protection measures to increase control. Each of these options is briefly
outlined below.
Design patents, which sit at the crossroads between patent and
copyright, offer protection to utilitarian objects embodying ornamental
design features.1s1 Objects that do not contain sufficient creativity for

copyright may nevertheless enjoy design patent protection. 152 This
category of works pushes against this Article's focus on purely utilitarian
files, but given design patent law's low bar for ornamentality,153 design
patents serve as a potential avenue for protection.
Even this brief introduction to design patents requires a caveat: like
utility patents, digital files present challenges to the design patent
regime. Design patents are granted only to "article[s] of manufacture"154
and it is unclear whether digital files displayed on a computer screen fall
into this category.155 Although the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
has issued many design patents for digital icons as depicted on a
computer screen, no reported court decision has upheld the validity of
design patent claims to digital representations.1 56 In a somewhat related
context, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit opined that the
word "articles" in the Tariff Act of 1930 includes only material things
and does not include transmission of digital data.57 In the design patent
context, the "article" could be the computer screen on which the design

151 See 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012).
152 Under current doctrine, a work can simultaneously enjoy design patent and copyright
protection. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) ("Neither the Copyright Statute nor any
other says that because a thing is patentable it may not be copyrighted."); In re Yardley, 493
F.2d 1389 (C.C.P.A. 1974); see, e.g., Sarah Burstein, The PatentedDesign, 83 TENN. L. REV. 161,
168-69 (2015).
153 Since almost any design leaves "alternative designs" available, the test for ornamentality
is easily met. See Best Lock Corp. v. Ilco Unican Corp., 94 F.3d 1563, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(Newman, J., dissenting) ("A design is 'not dictated by function alone' when there are
alternative designs or configurations available for the article of manufacture... .") (holding
that ornamentality fails if the design is primarily functional); William J. Seymour & Andrew W.
Torrance, (R)evolution in Design PatentableSubject Matter: The Shifting Meaning of "Article of
Manufacture," 17 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 183, 189-90 (2013) (noting the lack of a requirement
that the design be aesthetically pleasing).
154 35 U.S.C. § 171(a).
155 See Burstein, supra note 152, at 204-07 (discussing design patent protection for digital
icons); Seymour & Torrance, supra note 153, at 206-15.
156 See Seymour & Torrance, supra note 153, at 205.
157 ClearCorrect Operating, L.L.C. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 810 F.3d 1283, 1286 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (holding that the word "articles" in the Tariff Act of 1930, which provides the
International Trade Commission with authority to remedy only those unfair acts that involve
the importation of articles, includes only material things and does not include transmission of
digital data).
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appears, rather than the file itself. But even under this interpretation
there is tension because the image on the phone is transitory.15 8
Further, design patent claims to smart phone icons differ in
substance from claims to digital manufacturing files. A smart phone or
similar icon often performs a dual role. It is, of course, the functional
way to access the program. But it also plays a role somewhat similar to
printed designs worked into (e.g., painted or etched) an object, which
are squarely within design patent law's domain. Many icons can offer
ornamentation even when the app of the program is not in use.15 9
Design files, on the other hand, do not exist to decorate one's computer
screen. Rather, the image is used primarily, if not exclusively, as a means
of creating, manipulating, and understanding what the file will
manufacture. Thus, digital manufacturing files seem in many ways a
poor fit for design patent law, unless perhaps protection is limited to
files for physical objects that would otherwise qualify for design patent
protection.
Even if design patent law does not protect digital files directly, it
offers rights-holders the opportunity to sue for indirect infringement
where the file will manufacture an object otherwise protected by a
design patent. The limitations to an indirect infringement claim for
design patents mirror those of utility patents. Specifically, an accused
infringer must have knowledge of the patent and an intent to infringe.160
Of course, the patent owner also must identify acts of direct
infringement, which can be difficult with decentralized 3D printing.
Trademark and trade dress law constitute another avenue for legal
control. Trademark law protects source indicating symbols used on or
in connection with goods. 161 Under this Article's focus on purely
utilitarian objects, trade dress law will not be implicated, because trade
dress is only protectable when distinctive.162 Trademark law, however,
offers important protections.
Creators can include trademarks within their digital files such that
the mark would appear on the 3D printed product. Assuming the
requirements of trademark protection are met, the creator would enjoy
protection against competitors who sold physical items bearing the

&

158 See John R. Bould III, Comment, Redefining Reality: Why Design Patent Protection
Should Expand to the Virtual World, 66 AM. U. L. REv. 1113, 1147-49 (2017); Seymour
Torrance, supra note 153, at 208-14.
159 Of course, they can be moved into subfolders so that they do not decorate (or clutter,
depending on the perspective) the screen.
160 See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 765-66 (2011).
161 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2012) (defining trademark).
162 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212-16 (2000) (holding that
product design must be distinctive to enjoy trade dress protection and that it cannot be
inherently distinctive).
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creator's trademark.163 But the protection may not extend to sales of
digital files bearing the trademarks, because the Supreme Court's
decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.164
mandates that the Lanham Act's phrase "origin of goods" "refers [only]
to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to
the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those
goods."165 As Mark McKenna and I have argued in depth, Dastar's
central holding dictates that courts cannot consider the internal content

of digital files (including trademarks within the digital file) when
determining direct trademark infringement. 166 In proper circumstances,
however, courts can hold purveyors of digital files liable as indirect
trademark infringers, assuming the requisite elements are shown,
including knowledge that the downstream user will commit trademark
infringement.167

On the other hand, trademarks can play a powerful role for
creators of digital files when the mark appears external to the digital file.
For example, many Internet intermediaries that host digital
manufacturing files prominently display the username of the entity that
created each file. 168 That name serves as an explicit source indicator to

consumers. Customers will come to appreciate that certain usernames
correlate with high-quality files and may return to that source for future
purchases. Trademark law protects those source indications, and anyone
falsely using another's username will risk trademark infringement
liability.169
Besides design patents and trademarks, trade secret law can

provide some protections. 170 A trade secret is information that "derives
independent economic value . .

from not being generally known to,

and not being readily ascertainable by proper means [and that is] the
subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
163 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125.
164 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
165 Id. at 37.
166 Mark P. McKenna & Lucas S. Osborn, Trademarks and Digital Goods, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1425, 1430-56 (2017); Lucas S. Osborn, Trademark Boundaries and 3D Printing, 50
AKRON L. REV. 865, 877-80 (2016) [hereinafter Osborn, Trademark Boundaries];see also Mark
P. McKenna, Dastar's Next Stand, 19 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 357, 365-66 (2012).
167 See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853-54 (1982).
168 See, e.g., Lewisite, Laboratory Pipette, THINGIVERSE (Oct. 1, 2013), https://
www.thingiverse.com/thing:159052/#files (offering a 3D printable file for a pipette and
prominently displaying the creator's name, "lewisite").
169 See McKenna & Osborn, supra note 166, at 1453, 1467-69.
170 Trade secrets are protected largely on a state-by-state basis, and forty-seven states have
adopted a version of the Uniform State Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
(UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1985). Recently Congress enacted the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016,
Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130 Stat. 376, but that law explicitly preserves existing state law. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1836(f) (2012).
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maintain its secrecy."171 Thus, to qualify for trade secret protection, the
owner would need to keep the thing a secret. This requirement largely
disqualifies those who make their digital files publicly available. But for
those who want to keep their files "in house," trade secret laws can help
protect owners who are willing to put forth reasonable efforts to
maintain secrecy. Even if a creator keeps its digital files in house,
however, if the output of those files is available to the public (such as by
purchasing a 3D printed part), trade secrecy protection may be lost if
one can reverse engineer or independently create the digital file based
off the purchased item.172

Outside of the IP realm, contract law can provide creators control
over files. Paradigmatically, contracts represent private agreements
between two parties who have mutually agreed to terms. 173 Free market
economies value freedom to contract for many reasons, including beliefs
about individual autonomy and the efficiency of private ordering. 174 For
purposes of this Article, contract law's most relevant doctrines include
notice and privity. As a doctrine, notice relates to ensuring that those
entering into a contract have been alerted to the presence of the
contract's terms. 175A court generally will not presume a party's assent to
terms for which it has not received adequate notice.176 The doctrine,
privity, generally requires parties to be directly connected by contract in
order to have the right to sue. 177 Though there are exceptions for third
party beneficiaries of a contract and for sellers' breaches of warranty
involving injury,178 the doctrine continues to have relevance, especially

to downstream file recipients.17 9
Technology allows creators to circumvent privity problems by
creating a "pop-up" screen that requires any subsequent user to agree to
80 Like servitudes that run
the terms imposed by the original creator.o
171 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4).
172 See id. § 1 cmt. (indicating that proper means of discovering a trade secret include

reverse engineering and independent invention).
173 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) ("[T]he
formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of mutual assent to
the exchange. . .. ").
174 See, e.g., Lucas S. Osborn, The Leaky Common Law: An "Offer to Sell" as a Policy Tool in
PatentLaw and Beyond, 53 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 143, 147 (2013).
175 See, e.g., Specht v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 29-30 (2d Cir. 2002)
(requiring notice of the terms before the user will be bound).
176 Id.
177 See 18 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 52:38 (4th ed. 2017).
178

See id.

See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?Property Rights and Contract in the
"Newtonian" World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 119-20 (1997); Sharon
K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name Is Still a Contract: Examining the Effectiveness of
Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Databases,45 IDEA: J.L. & TECH. 119, 147 (2005).
180 See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885, 930-32 (2008).
179
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with property or chattels, these terms purport to establish obligations
binding on any user of the file.s18 The law traditionally has disfavored
servitudes on personal chattels, 182 so the extent to which such terms are
binding is unclear, though courts uphold many of them. Additionally,
where a file implicates an IP right, there is confusion as to whether the
breach of a contract provision leads to liability not only for breach of
contract, but also for infringement of the IP. 183 This Article notes but
does not attempt to resolve these uncertainties, and relies instead on the
common sense observation that however courts resolve them will make
contractual protections either stronger or weaker. Regardless of the
outcome, contracts will continue to play an important role.
Despite all the uncertainty surrounding contract provisions as they
relate to digital files, one certainty is that a user must have notice of the
terms.184 Notice becomes crucial if anyone removes the terms from the
file such that downstream recipients receive the file without notice of or
assent to the terms: such recipients will be free from the contractual
obligations. This can significantly weaken the power of contracts for
those seeking to control downstream uses.
The weaknesses and uncertainties of contractual provisions will
lead creators to consider using extralegal protection avenues.
Specifically, technological protection measures (TPM) can include
digital rights management (DRM), file comparison methods, and file
tracking methods. DRM can control the access, use, and distribution of
files through encryption. 185Many see DRM as an important part of 3D
printing's future, and companies have even patented DRM strategies.186
In addition, file comparison methods use sophisticated algorithms to

181 Id. at 931.
182 Id. at 906.
183 See, e.g., Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (2017) (holding

&

that authorized sales of patented products exhausted patent rights in the product, but not
clearly addressing when and whether leases of products would exhaust patent rights); Kirtsaeng
v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (2013) (holding that an authorized, foreign sale of
copyrighted books exhausted the copyright protection for those books); John F. Duffy
Richard Hynes, Statutory Domain and the Commercial Law of Intellectual Property, 102 VA. L.
REv. 1 (2016); Orly Lobel, From Status to Contract in IntellectualProperty Law, 96 B.U. L. REV.
869 (2016); Guy A. Rub, Copyright Survives: Rethinking the Copyright-ContractConflict, 103
VA. L. REV. 1141 (2017); Van Houweling, supra note 180.
184 Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the Feudal
Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENv. U. L. REV. 577, 594 (1994).
185 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 575, 580-88 (2003)
(describing various types of DRM).
186 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 8,286,236 (issued Oct. 9, 2012). The patent, titled
"Manufacturing Control System," contains claims directed to the concept of associating digital
manufacturing files with authorization codes. Id. A machine (e.g., a 3D printer) will not print
an object unless it receives the file's authorization code and the code indicates the file is eligible
to be printed (e.g., it is lawfully purchased). Id.
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compare two files to see if one is a copy of the other. File tracking
methods allow a party to track where a particular file (including copies
thereof) have been sent, downloaded, and used.187 Another TPM is a
model whereby the seller does not sell the file to the buyer, but only
streams the data to the buyer's 3D printer for a single print. 188 Much like
streaming a movie, with this technology the buyer never retains the
digital file and thus cannot copy it or share it with others.
Of course, technologically sophisticated users can get around TPM.
Codes can be cracked, tracking software can be removed, and streamed
data can be captured and then shared. Although the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act prohibits circumvention of some DRM, the prohibition
only applies to works protected by copyright law.189 Thus, it would not
be unlawful to circumvent DRM that protects noncopyrightable files. 190
This Part provided an overview of the legal doctrines and
technological means most salient to controlling various digital works,
and considered the legal and practical boundaries of these doctrines.
The next Part analyzes how the law should integrate and take account of
these doctrines and boundaries to channel works to the appropriate
protection.

187 See Andre, MarkAny Develops DRM and Piracy Protectionfor 3D Print Files, 3DERS.ORG
(Mar. 31, 2016), http://www.3ders.orglarticles/20160331-markany-develops-drm-and-piracyprotection-for-3d-print-files.html (describing TPM such as "Feature Extraction, which is
capable of extracting information from a particular design and examining it against other
similar designs to better prevent piracy; Digital Forensics, a feature which essentially
watermarks digital designs and can track ownership information if a leak does occur").
188 See Tom Simonite, Copy Protection for 3-D Printing Aims to Prevent a Piracy Plague,
MIT TECH. REVIEW (Aug. 27, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/518591/copyprotection-for-3-d-printing-aims-to-prevent-a-piracy-plague.
189 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2012) ("No person shall circumvent a technological measure that
effectively controls access to a work protectedunder this title." (emphasis added)).
190 On the other hand, some companies have made the argument that part of the TPM itself
is a copyrightable work such that the sale of circumvention devices violates the DMCA's antitrafficking provision regarding access controls under 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2). See Chamberlain
Grp., Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The anti-trafficking provisions
are designed to prevent someone from creating or distributing programs that will circumvent
TPMs if those programs were "primarily designed" or have "only limited commercial
significant purpose or use other than to circumvent" TPMs that protect copyrighted works.
Thus, if a given TPM protected access to only a proportionally few noncopyrighted files,
trafficking in a circumvention program would violate the DMCA. If, on the other hand, the
TPM protected proportionally many noncopyrighted works, the circumvention program would
not be "primarily designed" or have "only limited commercially significant purpose or use
other than to circumvent" TPMs that protected copyrighted works. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
Compare Chamberlain, 381 F.3d at 1202 ("We conclude that 17 U.S.C. § 1201 prohibits only
forms of access that bear a reasonable relationship to the protections that the Copyright Act
otherwise affords copyright owners."), with MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc., 629
F.3d 928, 950 (9th Cir. 2010) (refusing to read a nexus requirement into the statute).
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Untethered from the strictures of legal doctrine, this Part turns to
how the law should treat digital works, with special attention to
channeling the works to the appropriate IP regime (or perhaps away
from IP altogether). The law currently treats many digital works in
largely the way it should. Copyright law covers digital movies, songs,
and art, as one would expect given the extensive creativity inherent in
such works.191 But utilitarian application programs and digital
manufacturing files of utilitarian objects contain minimal creativity, and
protecting them with a copyright system designed to incentivize
creativity risks misallocating the IP system's powers. 192
Any undertaking to assess proper IP protection and channeling
must bear in mind that our economic system operates on a background
assumption of freedom to copy. "In general, unless an intellectual
property right such as a patent or copyright protects an item, it will be
subject to copying."93 Further, "free exploitation of ideas will be the
rule, to which the protection of a federal patent [or other IP] is the
exception."l94 Following the incentive rationale that undergirds most of
the U.S. IP system, the law should seek to protect digital files from
copying if such protection is necessary to maintain adequate incentives
for people to create and disseminate them. Absent IP or other barriers,
the cost of digital copying is virtually zero. Thus, creators likely need
some appropriability mechanism to recoup their costs to maintain
incentives to create. 195 But that does not necessarily mean creators need
IP laws.
A.

UtilitarianDigital ManufacturingFiles

One set of computer programs (broadly defined), digital
manufacturing files, require careful analysis. To reemphasize an earlier
point, if the file will manufacture a creative object, copyright law does
and should provide protection. But files that will manufacture purely
utilitarian objects require a more nuanced analysis.

191 That is not to say that the current copyright term is the optimal length, but that is an
analysis beyond the scope of this Article.
192 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Should the Law Care Why Intellectual Property Rights Have
Been Asserted?, 53 Hous. L. REV. 549, 587-88 (2015); Reichman, supra note 7, at 802.
193 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
194 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
195 See Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575 (2002).
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Whether patent law should protect digital manufacturing files of
utilitarian objects is in some ways straightforward. Because the files are
utilitarian in nature, they fit comfortably within the patent system.
Assuming that the underlying physical objects otherwise meet the
requirements for patentability such as novelty and nonobviousness,196
extending robust patent protection to the files aligns with the patent
system's policy parameters.1 97 For this reason, I believe that courts or
Congress should adopt either Dan Brean's proposal for patent claims
directed to digital manufacturing files198 or Tim Holbrook's and my
proposal for a doctrine of digital patent infringement. 199
True, the likelihood of a legislative or judicial adoption of such
proposals is uncertain at best. At the same time, it is important to
recognize that current patent law provides protection for files in at least
two ways. First, through direct infringement against those who "make" a
file covered by a Beauregard claim.200 Second, through indirect
infringement against those who knowingly sell files that will print
patented objects.201 These incentives, though perhaps sub-optimal, are
better than nothing.
Given the current lack of adequate patent protection for digital
manufacturing files of inventive objects, and the fact that patents protect
only novel and nonobvious inventions, courts will be tempted to protect
files via copyright. On the whole, I think this is a mistake, though the
consequences would be varied. Copyright protection would, for
example, fill a gap for those patentable inventions whose value is eroded
by difficulties of patent enforcement against digital files. But copyright
protection for files would extend far beyond patentable objects and
potentially encompass all files for utilitarian objects.
Copyright protection is about incentivizing creativity, not
utilitarian inventions.202 The miniscule creativity, if it may be called that,
embodied in digital manufacturing files requires no exogenous

196 This is an important caveat. In no way should patent law protect files that will
manufacture known or obvious things. A person does not need a patent's strong incentive to
digitize a known or obvious object. Such a patent would block the progress of science by
imposing barriers to noninventive files.
197 For an inquiry into whether the decreased innovation costs associated with digital
manufacturing suggest that patents in this area may benefit from recalibration, see generally
Osborn et al., supra note 10.
198 Brean, supra note 142, at 848-63.
199 Holbrook & Osborn, supra note 124, at 1353-69.
200 See supra text accompanying notes 141-50.
201 See supra text accompanying note 132.
202 See Viva R. Moffat, The Copyright/PatentBoundary, 48 U. RICH. L. REv. 611, 611-12
(2014).
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stimulus.203 Using copyright law to foster digital manufacturing files is
thus misusing copyright law204; it is transposing the copyright system's

policy-balancing to a utilitarian realm for which it was not designed.205
On the other hand, copyright law used to protect maps and charts,
which were primarily utilitarian works, without regard to creativity.2 06
And copyright protects most computer software, much of which is
primarily utilitarian and thus a poor fit for copyright theory. But we
have reached a relative d6tente with most software because many believe
some protection is needed against literal software copying to maintain
utilitarian incentives, and thin copyrights seem to do the trick.

203 The effort-or sweat of the brow-required to make the file might require some
stimulus, but that effort is not geared toward generating creativity and is not protectable in the
United States. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1991). Other
countries continue to endorse a sweat of the brow doctrine. See Directive 96/9/EC, of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 1996 on the Legal Protection of
Databases, 1996 O.J. (L 77) (protecting databases). U.K. law traditionally endorsed a version of
the sweat of the brow doctrine (i.e., originality means a result of author's own skill, labor,
judgment, and effort). See, e.g., Indep. Television Publ'ns Ltd. v. Time Out Limited Ltd. & Elliot
[19841 Ch 64 (Eng.). But recent European Union decisions have put pressure on that view. See,
e.g., Case C-5/08, Infopaq Int'l A/S v. Danske Dagblades Forening, 2009 E.C.R. 1-6569; Football
Dataco Ltd. v. Yahoo! U.K. Ltd., C-604/10, March 1, 2012 (ECJ); Andreas Rahmatian,
Originality in UK Copyright Law: The Old "Skill and Labour" Doctrine Under Pressure,44 INT'L
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 4, 6 (2013) (arguing that it is not clear how much E.U.
law has changed U.K. law).
204 By misuse I do not necessarily mean unjustifiable as a matter of innovation policy
generally, because copyright protection may be the best available option among viable
alternatives. Rather, I mean that protecting these utilitarian files does not follow from the
purposes of copyright law. See, e.g., David G. Luettgen, Functional Usefulness vs.
Communicative Usefulness: Thin Copyright Protectionfor the Nonliteral Elements of Computer
Programs, 4 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 233, 252 (1996) ("Copyright law should not provide any
protection to computer programs for the simple reason that computer programs are not within
the domain of copyright."); cf Feist, 499 U.S. at 359-60 (rejecting a "sweat of the brow"
rationale for protecting factual compilations that lacked a modicum of creativity); Comput.
Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 712 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Generally, we think that
copyright registration-with its indiscriminating availability-is not ideally suited to deal with
the highly dynamic technology of computer science. Thus far, many of the decisions in this area
reflect the courts' attempt to fit the proverbial square peg in a round hole.... While incentive
based arguments in favor of broad copyright protection are perhaps attractive from a pure
policy perspective, ultimately, they have a corrosive effect on certain fundamental tenets of
copyright doctrine." (citing Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 58
(D. Mass. 1990))).
205 See, e.g., H. SUBCOMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. & THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, 102 CONG.,

PATENT-COPYRIGHT LAWS OVERLAP STUDY 88 (Comm. Print 1991) (stating that protection of

functionality "is assigned to patents where a much more rigorous test must be undergone and
the barriers to entry, in terms of time, cost, and complexity, are higher"); Viva R. Moffat,
Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping Intellectual Property
Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1512-13 (2004); cf Reichman, supra note 7, at 830-32
(arguing against allowing the output of CAD files to claim copyright protection on a theory that
the output is a joint work with the copyrightable file).
206 See, e.g., Weinreb, supra note 33, at 1181-83.
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One objection to using copyright law might be that its extremely
long term-currently life of the author plus seventy years for most
works207-results in overprotection. While the term is long, copyright
law has a salutary feature in that independent creation will not give rise
to liability.208 Moreover, for works based on noncopyrighted subjects

(mountains, wrenches, etc.), a second artist is free to copy the
noncopyrighted subject. 209 For files of utilitarian objects, this means that
copyright law (if it is assumed to apply) will not prevent a second party
from creating its own file of the exact same object, as long as it does so
from scratch.210 In reality therefore, copyright for files offers practical
protection only for the time and effort it takes another party
independently to create the same file. Thus, one might ask, what is the
harm of permitting copyright protection?
One response is that even the modest costs of creating digital
manufacturing files from scratch impedes proliferation. 3D printing
technology heralds a new era of numerous, global, rapid, and
incremental improvements that in the aggregate amount to a flood of
innovation. Allowing others freely to copy the files reduces friction and
speeds the cycle. True, users can independently create the same
utilitarian file, but this slows progress and is often wasteful.211 And
uncertainty as to who has what rights may lead to foregone
opportunities.

207 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2012).
208 See, e.g., Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936).
209 Osborn, Limits of Creativity,supra note 38, at 63 n.181.
210 Even assuming protectable creativity in the file, the creativity is in the arrangement of the
various commands and text, not in the resulting utilitarian object (e.g., a hammer). As long as
the second person bases her file on a physical hammer and does not copy the code verbatim,
there is no copyright infringement. The same is true for software performing utilitarian
functions.
211 See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books,
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 348 (1970); Joseph Farrell,
Standardizationand IntellectualProperty, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 49 (1989) ("[I]t is inefficient to
protect the aspects of an innovation that, for efficiency, should be imitated; it is also inefficient
to protect the arbitrary choices whose commercial value is created solely by the network
incentives to imitate-and to protect the useful ideas only indirectly by protecting these
ancillary innovations. Such protection not only seems likely to have adverse consequences on
compatibility, but also protects only indirectly and haphazardly the useful ideas, the costs of
whose creation intellectual-property policy is meant to cover."); Weinreb, supra note 33, at
1179 ("In the context of works that have only functional value, a prohibition of lazy copying is
the equivalent of a requirement simply of variation, which, as far as the works themselves are
concerned, might be regarded as socially useless and wasteful."). It is possible that, forced to
recreate the file from scratch, a second-comer might discover an improvement, but it is unclear
how necessary independent creation is to the process of generating improvements. It may be
that copying (and thus obtaining) the file more quickly and cheaply allows an imitator to study
the file and the physical object more quickly and thus to improve it.
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Even granting those objections, one might argue that copyright
protection has similar effects in the realm of traditional software, and
yet protection persists. But digital manufacturing files' longer useful life,
manipulability, and ease of copying distinguish them from traditional
application software. Laypeople will more easily copy, alter, and build
upon digital manufacturing files as compared to traditional software.
Though it is not prohibitively difficult to copy traditional software,
many users probably do not know how to (i.e., many laypeople will not
know where to find the pertinent files). Comparatively, copying a digital
manufacturing file is as easy as copying an MP3 file. More pointedly,
whereas most laypeople would not know how to modify application
programs, CAD environments make it relatively easy to modify a digital
manufacturing file.
Laypeople's ability to easily copy and modify digital manufacturing
files will lead to copious accidental infringement if copyright protection
exists. Copyright protection attaches automatically, which means an
uncountable number of protected files would circulate the Internet.212
Additionally, infringement does not require intent. It requires copying,
but the act of copying a file, even absent any knowledge of copyright
protection, will constitute infringement.
The absence of an intent requirement raises another normative
dimension. Unlike MP3 files, news stories, and movies, where society
understands, however imperfectly, that copyright protections exist,
laypeople are unlikely to expect that copyright protects digital
manufacturing files of utilitarian objects. Of course, if we decide the files
should be protected by copyright for other reasons, then ignorance of
the law is no excuse to infringement.
But given the questionable grounds for protecting the files with
copyright, the costs of litigation push further against granting copyright
protection. Any litigation entails obvious financial and emotional costs,
and copyright litigation is no exception. Further, the presence of
innumerable copyright-protected files coupled with unsuspecting and
unwitting infringers is a recipe for copyright "trolls" and social
discontent. Much as they have done with Internet news content and
movies,213 "trolls" can acquire rights to digital files and sue unsuspecting
212 The phenomenon is not limited to the United States. Copyright protection attaches
automatically for all signatories to the Berne convention, which includes most countries. See
Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 5(1), Sept. 9, 1886, 102
Stat. 2853, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. Inexpensive access to utilitarian files may take on a more urgent
character for less wealthy countries. See, e.g., J.M. Pearce et al., 3-D Printing of Open Source
Appropriate Technologies for Self-Directed Sustainable Development, 3 J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. 17,
17-18 (2010).
213 See, e.g., Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an Empirical Study, 100 IowA L. REv. 1105,
1111-13 (2015) (discussing copyright trolls).
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infringers. Regardless of who sues them, people become outraged when
sued for things they do not understand to be wrong. Observers of such
litigation likewise become angry. The result would likely be a
metaphorical black eye for the copyright system.
Moreover, digital manufacturing files differ from many software
applications in that the former will enjoy longer useful lives. Many
software applications enjoy a relatively short useful life before they are
obsolete. This rapid obsolescence renders the majority of the software's
copyright term inconsequential: no one cares enough to copy the
software after it is useless. Thus, the window for copyright infringement
is short, and concerns about an overly long copyright protection period
largely disappear for pragmatic reasons. Digital manufacturing files of
useful objects, in contrast, will typically enjoy long lives. A hammer or
wrench will likely be just as useful one hundred years from now as today
(assuming the file format has not become obsolete). The files' long lives
mean that the long copyright term is salient. An innocent individual
ninety-five years from now might accidentally infringe the copyright.
The logistics of trying to determine which utilitarian files are protected
by copyright would be next to impossible in many cases.
In sum, copyright protection for purely utilitarian manufacturing
files is not only a poor fit doctrinally, but also in many ways
normatively. One may query whether copyright protection is the best
available option to offer some form of protection, in which case the
utilitarian argument for copyright protection would persist. As
explained in the following Sections, however, copyright protection is not
needed to incentivize these creations.
When examining the dynamics of noncopyright/patent protection
for digital manufacturing files, it is helpful to distinguish between files
for simple devices versus those for highly complex devices. The need for
and methods of appropriability for each category will differ.
1.

Relatively Simple Digital Manufacturing Files

Files for simple utilitarian devices will generally be easy to create
and will require little investment of time or money. Correspondingly,
they need little incentive, in the form of appropriability mechanisms, to
foster their development, even where the costs of copying are essentially
zero. This suggests that copyright protection may not be needed.
Indeed, despite our system's emphasis on monetary incentives,
many people create for nonmonetary reasons. These include the joy of
creation, a desire to help others, and a desire to garner reputational
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rewards.214 For many simple files, nonmonetary incentives will help or
even sufficiently encourage creation and dissemination. Evidence for
this phenomenon abounds in the open hardware movement 215 and on
websites such as thingiverse.com, which offer printable files for free.
Monetary incentives can of course further encourage creations.
Assuming the files do not enjoy protection under copyright or patent
law, other legal, normative, and technological means exist through
which the creator can monetize a creation. For relatively simple files,
nonlegal appropriability mechanisms will play a prominent role.
The first nonlegal mechanism is well known: lead time advantage.
Digital copying is instantaneous, suggesting lead time might be zero. 216
In fact, the copyist faces an informational asymmetry from not knowing
which files are worth copying and selling. The copyist must often wait to
figure out which files are popular before deciding to copy them.217
During this time, the original creator can make a financial return on the
file.
Second, community norms may also allow creators to earn money
for their simple files. A copyist must find an appropriate platform
through which to sell the copied file and notify would-be purchasers of
that channel. The copyist may not be able to use the same platform as
the original creator because moderator rules or community norms may
preclude or frown upon copies. Moreover, some purchasers may prefer
to buy from the original creator even if it costs more. If so, the original
creator may enjoy continued sales on the original platform (though
admittedly less than in the absence of competition).218 Where the costs
of creation are small, such sales may be sufficient incentive to create.
Third, TPM can prevent or at least slow the copying of files and
provide creators with tracking information to discover those who

214 See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV.
1745, 1760 (2012); Osborn et al., supra note 10, at 1228-29.
215 See, e.g., Daniel K. Fisher & Peter J. Gould, Open-Source Hardware Is a Low-Cost
Alternative for Scientific Instrumentation and Research, 1 MOD. INSTRUMENTATION 8, 8-9
(2012); Joshua M. Pearce, Building Research Equipment with Free, Open-Source Hardware, Scl.,
Sept. 14, 2012, at 1303.
216 See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 7, at 835-37 (arguing for sui generis protection for digital
works to create lead time). The works at the center of Professor Reichman's study generally
required much more investment to create as compared to simple digital manufacturing files.
217 On the other hand, technology allows wholesale copying of another's content on an
essentially real-time basis. See Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 966 (N.D. Cal.
2013) (discussing allegations that defendant republished Craigslist's online advertisements by
scraping the listings "in real time, directly from the Craigslist website" so as to "essentially
replicate[] the entire Craigslist website"). Such technology may divert some sales
instantaneously, but only to those who know of and patronize the copier's marketplace.
218 There is also the possibility of seeding rival sites with corrupt files that appear to be the
copycat file, though this might contravene some people's sense of ethics.
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breach contractual restrictions.219 TPMs are not perfect, and dedicated
hackers can circumvent them.220 But circumvention likely does not pose
an existential threat to manufacturing files for relatively simple objects.
In most cases, a would-be copier would only bother to circumvent DRM
if the file was already selling well (who wants to access or disseminate
worthless files?). By that time, the creator has earned a decent return on
a minimal investment and can continue to sell directly to those who
want to buy from the originator.
Besides nonlegal appropriability regimes, the legal system outside
of utility patent and copyright law offers avenues for remuneration. For
example, design patent law-which, as discussed, requires less creativity
than copyright law-offers protection to utilitarian objects embodying
ornamental design features.221 It is true that purely utilitarian objects
should not qualify for design protection, but the low threshold for
ornamentality means that a fair number of objects will qualify. 222

As compared to copyright protection's flaws discussed above,
design patents offer certain advantages. First, to obtain a design patent,
the design must be novel and nonobvious,223 a more rigorous standard
that will limit protection to fewer files than copyright.224 In addition, the
term, fifteen years from the date of filing,225 is far shorter than the
copyright term. Thus, files will enter the public domain more quickly,
allowing others to use and build upon them freely. On the other hand,
although copyright law's formal term is longer, its practical term is
much shorter because independent creation is a defense in copyright,
but not in design patent infringement. 226
Assuming that design patent law is well calibrated or even needed
to incentivize ornamental design, propositions not free from doubt,227
219 See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text (discussing TPMs).
220 See, e.g., David Fry, Circumventing Access Controls Under the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act: Analyzing the SecuROM Debate, 2009 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 5.
221 See 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012).
222 See supra note 153 and accompanying text (discussing ornamentality).
223 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-03.
224 Because design patent protection will extend to fewer files than if the law protected all

&

files via copyright, some may argue that copyright protection would be necessary to fill the gap.
For reasons already discussed, I think the argument is unpersuasive.
225 See 35 U.S.C. § 173.
226 See Roger D. Blair & Thomas F. Cotter, Strict Liability and Its Alternatives in Patent Law,
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 799, 800-01 (2002).
227 See Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDozo ARTS
ENT. L.J. 1105, 1134-35 (2008) (arguing design patent protection is too broad); Barton Beebe,
Intellectual PropertyLaw and the Sumptuary Code, 123 HARV. L. REV. 809, 862 (2010) (arguing
that design protection laws, including design patent laws "are probably the clearest examples we
have of the 'functional transformation' of intellectual property law into a body of law being
used not simply to 'promote the Progress,' but also, and in tension with that goal, to preserve
our system of consumption-based differentiation in the face of copying technology that
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extending some protection to digital manufacturing files of ornamental
objects makes sense. 228 Note, however, that design patents suffer from
weaknesses similar to utility patents because they do not cover files in
the abstract.229 Mere file transfers, therefore, should not constitute direct
infringement. And although indirect infringement claims are available
against purveyors of digital files, they may underprotect the right
holders who must prove knowledge and intent to infringe. Again,
assuming the design patent system is well calibrated, one could argue to
extend design patent protection to the files directly, just as I argued
should be done with utility patents. 230
In addition to design patents, trademark law can provide creators
with protections, though there are limits. As discussed in Section II.C,
trade dress protection will not apply to purely utilitarian objects, and
trademark protection may not extend to trademarks appearing "inside"
the digital manufacturing files under Dastar.231 As I have argued
elsewhere, ignoring marks inside of a digital file comports with
trademark law's concerns for consumer confusion and avoids overlap
with other IP

laws.232

Yet trademark law has an important role to play in protecting
consumers' associations with the trademarks (often usernames) adopted
by file creators and website hosts. Creators and hosts can establish
reputations as sources for quality manufacturing files because good files
require attention to detail if they are to result in a functioning printed
object.233 In the ocean of files available on the Internet, many purchasers
will be willing to pay a premium for a trusted source. 234 As a result, the
threatens to undermine it"); Daniel H. Brean, Enough Is Enough: Time to Eliminate Design
Patents and Rely on More AppropriateCopyright and Trademark Protectionfor ProductDesigns,
16 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 325, 330-53 (2008) (arguing that the design patent system is no
longer needed because of growth in trade dress and copyright protection).
228 Primarily for the utilitarian reasons that justify the design patent system as a whole. One
could also justify design patent protection to prevent another regime from filling a perceived
void. See Reichman, Legal Hybrids, supra note 51, at 2464 (arguing that underprotection for
designs has historically led to the aggrandizement of copyright law to protect what design law
should protect).
229 See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
230 See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
231 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003).
232 McKenna & Osborn, supra note 166, at 1451-56; Osborn, Trademark Boundaries, supra
note 166, at 886-92.
233 See, e.g., Identifying and Repairing Common Mesh Errors, SIMPLIFY3D, https://
www.simplify3d.com/supportlarticles/identifying-and-repairing-common-mesh-errors
(last
visited Mar. 8, 2018).
234 Cf Gady Epstein, Mass Entertainment in the DigitalAge Is Still About Blockbusters, Not
Endless Choice, ECONOMIST (Feb. 11, 2017), http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/
21716467-technology-has-given-billions-people-access-vast-range-entertainment-gady
("Paradoxically, enabling every individual and product on the planet to find a market has made
it next to impossible for the market to find them."). Copiers can, however, earn reputations for
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marks used by creators and websites will reduce consumer search costs
by allowing consumers to rely on the marks as short-hand for indicators
of quality.235 If another party adopts the same username or website
name, material consumer confusion can result.236 Trademark protection
will also incentivize creators to invest in creating quality files (and sites
to host quality files) because the reputational benefits will inure to the
mark holder. 237
Trade secrecy offers another potential avenue for protection, but it
seems an unlikely candidate for relatively simple mass-distributed files.
As its name implies, trade secret protection requires that the thing
protected remain a secret. But when a creator shares an STL or similar
file for the world to see, secrecy is lost.238 A creator could try to
circumvent this problem by distributing the file only in object code239 or
by streaming the file directly to the user's printer. But mass distributing
the file in object code will often be impractical because object code
needs to be calibrated to a particular 3D printer, rendering the file
useless for other 3D printers. 24 0 More importantly, the seller generally
must show the buyer an image of the device before the buyer can decide
to purchase it, and the disclosure of the picture likely destroys trade
secrecy protection for simple devices. Finally, even if a creator streams
the file to the printer, a purchaser can likely reverse engineer the file by
simply studying the printed object. If a purported trade secret is easily
discoverable, it will not constitute a trade secret. 241
A would-be trade secret holder could attempt to avoid the loss of
secrecy by forcing the purchaser to agree by contract to a no-reverseengineering clause, but this will not likely work. Even if the clause is
enforceable, if a bystander who is not bound by the clause can easily
understand how to make the object, secrecy will be lost.242 More
quality copies, thus reducing the impact of reputational returns to original creators.
235 See McKenna & Osborn, supra note 166, at 1460; Osborn, Trademark Boundaries, supra
note 166, at 889.
236 See McKenna & Osborn, supra note 166, at 1467-69; Osborn, Trademark Boundaries,
supra note 166, at 889.
237 See Osborn, TrademarkBoundaries, supra note 166, at 889.
238 Cf Warehouse Sols., Inc. v. Integrated Logistics, L.L.C., 610 F. App'x 881, 885 (11th Cir.
2015) (rejecting trade secret claim to a computer program's look and feel and functionality,
stating that dissemination of the software to users "necessarily revealed the information
[plaintiff] alleges to be secret (i.e., the program's 'features and functions')").
239 Courts have maintained the trade secrecy status of program files' source code when the
file is only distributed in object code. See, e.g., Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608,
617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
240 See Osborn, Limits of Creativity, supra note 38, at 32.
241 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1 cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1985) ("Often, the nature of
a product lends itself to being readily copied as soon as it is available on the market."); Sandeen,
supra note 179, at 135.
242 Agreements to keep things confidential might be enforced as a matter of contract but
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controversially, contract clauses that prohibit reverse engineering pit
competition law, including trade secrecy law's endorsement of reverse
engineering, against the policy in favor of freedom to contract.
Generally, clauses that prohibit reverse engineering are enforceable
under contract law.243 But the act of reverse engineering and use of the
information gleaned therefrom will not necessarily constitute trade
secret misappropriation.244
From an incentive standpoint, trade secret protection for relatively
simple files seems unnecessary and undesirable because the creators
expend little effort making them. Allowing trade secret protection for
files that are widely shared or easily reverse engineered makes little
sense doctrinally or normatively. Trade secret protection can last
indefinitely. 245 If courts upheld mass-marketed contractual terms
creating trade secrets where none otherwise exist, society would lose
much of its ability to use and build off of these files.246 In addition, the
incongruity between a legal right based on secrecy and society's practical
experience with the files and objects as widely available would likely lead
to a normative backlash.247 Trade secrecy is thus a poor fit for massmarketed, simple design files.
The most accessible form of legal protection for laypeople may be
contracts. Creators can insert various clauses into the terms of sale, such
should not create a trade secret when there is no secret. See Sandeen, supra note 179, at 144
("[T]he problem with many trade secret clauses, particularly those that are included in online
terms of use agreements, is that the information to be protected was not secret at the time the
alleged agreement was entered into. In the event the information was secret at some point in
time, it quickly lost its secrecy when it was widely distributed without adequate efforts to
maintain its secrecy. The fact that the information may have been distributed pursuant to a
blanket confidentiality agreement contained in a terms of use agreement does not change this
result because contracts cannot create trade secrets."); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT § 7(b)
(stating that the UTSA does not affect contractual remedies).
243 See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
("[P]rivate parties are free to contractually forego the limited ability to reverse engineer a
software product under the exemptions of the Copyright Act."); Davidson & Assocs. v. Internet
Gateway, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (E.D. Mo. 2004), affd sub nom. Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422
F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005). But see David A. Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public
Policy: Federal Preemption of Software License ProhibitionsAgainst Reverse Engineering, 53 U.
PITT. L. REV. 543, 624-26 (1992) (arguing for limits on no-reverse-engineering clauses).
244 See, e.g., Aqua Connect, Inc. v. Code Rebel, L.L.C., No. CV 11-5764-RSWL (MANx),
2012 WL 469737, at *4-8 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2012) (rejecting trade secret claim where plaintiff
argued defendant used "improper means" by reverse engineering in violation of a standard
form contract because reverse engineering is not improper means, but noting that the same acts
may give rise to a breach of contract claim); Sandeen, supra note 179, at 144.
245 See, e.g., Patrick Soon & Rebecca Bellow, The Top Four Advantages of Trade Secret
Protection,
WHGC,
https://www.whglawfirm.com/Top-4-Advantages-of-Trade-SecretProtection.shtml (last visited Mar. 8, 2018).
246 See Sandeen, supra note 179, at 154 (noting that false assertions of trade secret rights
hampers competition).
247 Cf. id. at 152-53 (noting wrongful assertions of trade secrecy are against public policy).
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as price, warranties, disclaimers, etc. Generally, courts will enforce
parties' private arrangements as long as notice of terms is given and the
terms are not unconscionable or contrary to clear public policy.248 Each
of these conditions to contractual enforceability, however, can pose
8
hurdles.
Providing notice of terms to direct purchasers or lessees presents
little problem because the seller can provide the terms prior to the
purchase. If that purchaser resells or gives the file away for free to
others, however, the downstream purchasers may not have notice of the
original seller's terms. Because the original seller is not in privity with
downstream transferees, the seller generally has no breach of contract
action against them.249 Sellers may attempt to circumvent this by adding
"pop up" contracts to the file that will force downstream users to agree
to the same terms. This strategy may work against some, but all it takes
is one user to strip the terms from the file, after which subsequent
recipients of that version will take the file without notice of the original
contractual terms. 250 Even assuming pop-up terms remain in files, the
sheer number of files, each of which may have its own unique terms,
presents information processing problems and potentially exponential
transactional costs.

25 1

People are willing to invest only so much time

studying those terms, especially for low-value items.
Aside from notice problems, some contract terms may be
unenforceable because they contravene public policy. Terms that
purport to limit the purchasers' rights, such as "single use only" or "no
resale" provisions, conflict with venerable public policies against
servitudes and restraints on alienation.252 Courts have historically

strongly disfavored such restraints and servitudes (restraints that
purport not only to bind the immediate purchaser, but also to "run with
the goods"),253 although that view has evolved.254
248 For support of this general statement, see, e.g., Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract
and FundamentalFairnessfor Individual Parties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV.
647, 647-53 (2009).
249 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (requiring
manifestation of assent); Merges, supra note 179, at 119. The person removing the terms may
be breaching the contract.
250 See, e.g., Merges, supra note 179, at 122 (noting the possibility that contractual terms can
be stripped out); Rub, supra note 183, at 1213 (noting ways to avoid contractual terms).
251 See Van Houweling, supra note 180, at 914-16.
252 See, e.g., Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 539 (2013) (discussing the

first sale doctrine in copyright law); JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF

PROPERTY 244 (2d ed. 1895) (stating that restraints on alienation "are inconsistent with that
ready transfer of property which is essential to the well-being of a civilized community, and
especially of a commercial republic").
253 See, e.g., Van Houweling, supra note 180, at 906-14; see also Daryl Lim, Self-Replicating
Technologies and the Challengefor the Patent and Antitrust Laws, 32 CARDOzo ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 131, 200 (2013).
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IP rights have complicated the restraints and servitudes analysis,255
but under this Article's view, most simple digital manufacturing files for
purely utilitarian works will not enjoy any IP protection.256 Although
the lack of IP rights removes one layer of complexity and weakens the
enforceability of restraints and servitudes, the remaining legal
framework is complex and evolving.257 A full analysis and critique of
this body of law is beyond the scope of this Article, but a few points
deserve attention. 258
Most importantly, the granularity and flexibility of contracts
suggest that they should play a central role in the protection of digital
files.259 Concurrently, a commitment to competition should guide the
judicial approach. Contracts, if granted complete freedom, can embody
private legislation260 that interferes with IP regimes.261 Contractual
rights can infect multitudes of files with myriad terms, such that the files
become over-encumbered and people cannot efficiently utilize and build
off of them.262
254 See, e.g., Glen 0. Robinson, PersonalProperty Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 145560 (2004) (reviewing cases); Alfred C. Server & William J. Casey, Contract-Based Post-Sale
Restrictions on PatentedProductsFollowing Quanta, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 622-25 (2013).
255 Server & Casey, supra note 254, at 625-35 (proposing an approach to assess the
enforceability of contract-based post-sale restrictions under state law); Van Houweling, supra
note 180, at 910-14.
256 For a hint at the complexities of the contract-IP interface, see supra note 183 and
accompanying text.
257 See generally Robinson, supra note 254 (arguing for a liberalization in the law of personal
property servitudes).
258 It is worth noting that one particular restraint, a clause prohibiting copying or the
transfer of copies of the file, has no analog in the world of tangible property. If I sold you a
physical widget, you could not effortlessly make exact copies of it (unless you were a magician).
With digital files, however, copying is immediate and costless, reducing lead time advantages.
259 See, e.g., Richard Epstein, Comment, Notice and Freedom of Contract in the Law of
Servitudes, 55 S. CAL. L. REv. 1353 (1982) (arguing in favor of a strong freedom to contract);
Merges, supra note 179, at 118-29 (noting ways in which contractual agreements can lead to
efficient outcomes in cyberspace).
260 See Friedrich Kessler, Contracts ofAdhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom ofContract,
43 COLuM. L. REV. 629 (1943) (describing how contracts of adhesion can act as private
legislation).
261 See, e.g., David Nimmer et al., The Metamorphosis of Contract into Expand, 87 CALIF. L.
REV. 17, 63 (1999) ("[Ilf an author uses contract law to enlarge that monopoly to apply to
exploitations beyond its congressionally sanctioned orbit, she is behaving illegitimately.");
Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright
Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 556 (1995) ("[T]he contractual use
restrictions that set up 'private' copyright law seem fundamentally at odds with the policy of
promoting the free flow of information."); Reichman, supra note 7, at 827-28.
262 See Merges, supra note 179, at 123 ("[M]any assets in the digital economy will
conceivably become so encumbered that potential value-adding future users will be
frustrated."); see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 114 (1993) (arguing

that "it is efficient to impose enough restraints now to prevent grantors from tying up resources
for the future in ways that seriously reduce the scope of the free market"); cf Michael A. Heller,
The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx to Markets, 111 HARV.
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Enforcement of servitude-like contractual restraints in works not
otherwise protected by IP, if widely adopted, would recreate a type of IP
regime, but without the corresponding benefits.263 If the works do not
qualify for congressionally determined IP protection, contract law
should not be given such free reign as to mimic those rights, which
could dampen socially beneficial uses and subvert a competitive
economy, 264 not least because private parties do not take account of
externalities created by private agreements, such as limits on follow-on
innovation.265 By failing to qualify for existing IP protections, society
has already decided that the seller's arguments in favor of needed
protections are outweighed by policies of free competition. This is
especially true where the files are easy to create and require little
incentive.
Of course, contracts only bind the parties that have consented to
them, and the existence of even numerous contracts will not create a
shadow IP regime. Discerning the limits of contracts has proved elusive,
but a couple of observations are noteworthy. First, a more fully mature
antitrust law guards against many anti-competitive practices.266 Second,
many courts have upheld such contractual restrictions,2 67 and we have
yet to see anything like a shadow IP regime.268 Relatedly, courts tend to
enforce restraints in business-to-business contracts more strictly than in
consumer transactions.269 Viral contracts of adhesion invite additional
L. REV. 621 (1998) (noting underuse problems when too many rights holders can block people
from using a resource).
263 See Sandeen, supra note 179, at 152-53 (arguing that contractual agreements to treat
non-trade secrets as trade secrets is against public policy).
264 Here, I am put in the situation of arguing against private ordering in the name of free
markets. This is not a new dilemma, and indeed exists in the long-standing disapproval of
servitudes and restraints on alienation.
265 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights
Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 538-58 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The
Law and Policy of IntellectualProperty Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 170 (1999).
266 See Robinson, supra note 254, at 1494-1515.
267 See, e.g., Celeritas Techs., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 150 F.3d 1354, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (involving a business-to-business contract); Universal Gym Equip., Inc. v. ERWA
Exercise Equip. Ltd., 827 F.2d 1542, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating, in a business-to-business
deal limiting defendant's use of information gleaned from reverse engineering, "[plarties to a
contract may limit their right to take action they previously had been free to take"); DB Riley,
Inc. v. AB Eng'g Corp., 977 F. Supp. 84, 89 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that plaintiff, in a
business-to-business deal, demonstrated a likelihood of success on its breach of contract claim
regarding confidentiality even though the information was not a trade secret).
268 See generally Rub, supra note 183 (arguing that courts have moved toward accepting that
contractual restrictions are not preempted by copyright law under 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) and that
this acceptance has not had significant effect on the public domain).
269 See Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of FairUse, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815, 859-60 (2015)
("As part of a confidentiality agreement between a startup and a big firm, for example, the
startup's insistence on a contractual restriction on reverse engineering ... would very likely be
respected. The same restrictions in a mass-market license agreement for software might be
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judicial scrutiny because they can proliferate exponentially on the
Internet, and they call into question the nature of assent. 270
At the same time, concerns over stifling webs of contract terms are
mitigated somewhat by the ease with which one can independently
create a similar digital manufacturing file. Without IP protection for the
files, when licensing terms become too burdensome third parties can
create competing files. Or a party might be willing to breach its contract
and provide the file, without contractual limitations, to others.
Contractual remedies are typically less generous than in IP, 271 perhaps
making people more willing to break a contract than infringe on IP. For
example, contractual remedies are compensatory in nature, not
punitive, and generally must be proved to a reasonable certainty. 272
Copyright remedies, on the other hand, can include either "the
copyright owner's actual damages and any additional profits of the
infringer" or statutory damages of up to $150,000 per infringed work.273
Happily, this Article need not solve some of the seemingly
intractable issues in contract law. Rather, it is enough to point out that
contracts provide an avenue for appropriability in the absence of IP
rights, and that avenue can be modulated depending on the outcome of
the debates just described. Given lead-time and reputational advantages
available to creators, even weak contract rights will provide a
proportional return to files of modest complexity.
The upshot of this analysis of simple digital manufacturing files is
clear. For a file without IP protection, a creator whose simple, purely
utilitarian (yet not patentable) creation becomes a huge hit would likely
lose significant income due to copying. Stronger or weaker contract
enforcement can modulate the losses. But instances of "jackpot"
creations would likely be extremely rare. It may happen every once in a
while, but the more frequent scenario is a file that enjoys modest sales
correlative to the creator's modest efforts. It is certainly true that the
prospect of "winning the jackpot" with one's simple utilitarian file might

treated quite differently.").
270 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the
Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429 (2002); Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the
Code-the Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967); W. David Slawson, Standard
Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971);
Van Houweling, supra note 180, at 933-35 (detailing notice and information-cost processing
issues with software license agreements).
271 See, e.g., Maureen A. O'Rourke, Rethinking Remedies at the Intersection of Intellectual
Propertyand Contract:Toward a Unified Body ofLaw, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1137, 1142-43 (1997).
272 RESTATEMENT

(SECOND)

OF CONTRACTS

§ 355

(AM. LAW. INST. 1981)

("Punitive

damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract .... ). "A term fixing unreasonably large
liquidated damages is unenforceable on grounds of public policy as a penalty." Id. § 356(1).
273 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2012).
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increase incentives to make such files, but it is not clear that this extra
incentive is needed.
2.

Complex Digital Manufacturing Files

Digital manufacturing files for complex utilitarian devices will
become increasingly prevalent. Already companies are producing jet
engine parts with 3D printers,274 and fully printed engines may follow.275
Obviously, more complex files will require more upfront investments of
time and energy. As compared to the simple devices analyzed above,
these complex files will thus require stronger appropriability
mechanisms to induce their development.
As already discussed, patent law can protect new and nonobvious
inventions, but many 3D printable complex devices will fall outside of
patent law's strenuous requirements.276 Hence, copyright law might
serve as a useful gap filler to incentivize creators incurring high costs. As
before, however, because these files will print purely utilitarian devices,
they will lack the modicum of creativity copyright law requires: a
complex utilitarian file may be thought of as nothing more than a
combination of many simple files. And where the combination is done
for purely utilitarian reasons, zero plus zero equals zero in terms of
copyright law's required creativity.
This is not worrisome, though, because the need for copyright
protection for more complex files is far from certain, as can be seen by
studying the market dynamics for the files. More complex items are
likely to be specially designed for individual or small groups of users,
typically business users. Transaction costs decrease where the numbers
of buyers and sellers are relatively small because they generally have an
easier time finding each other and tend to interact repeatedly. A low
transaction cost environment in turn makes private orderingindividually negotiated contracts-a particularly appropriate avenue for
control and remuneration.277
Individually negotiated contracts can be tailored to the parties'
specific needs and often do not involve the bargaining power
with
scrutiny-associated
resulting
judicial
disparities-and
274 GE GLOBAL RESEARCH (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.geglobalresearch.com/blog/3dprinting-creates-new-parts-aircraft-engines.
275 Mike Keller, These Engineers 3D Printed a Mini Jet Engine, Then Took It to 33,000 RPM,
GE REPORTS (Sept. 5, 2016), http://www.gereports.com/post/1 18394013625/these-engineers-3dprinted-a-mini-jet-engine-then.
276 Design patents, too, can provide protection if the object satisfies the statute's
ornamentality requirement.
277 See Osborn, Bits and Atoms, supra note 4, at 595.
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standardized consumer contracts. 278 Specialized parts are also less likely
to be resold downstream (because they are customized to the initial
buyer's needs), alleviating some concerns about servitudes that run with
files. Creators can, therefore, ably recoup their costs through contracts
and initial sales to the users.
In addition, the limited number of customers allows the seller to
police the contract's performance more easily. The seller will likely be
able to identify a breaching party, and the damages involved with
complex files are probably more significant than with simple files, thus
justifying the expenses of litigation. More pragmatically, the breaching
party is likely to be relatively wealthy and thus can actually pay a
judgment.
In many ways, the market for complex digital manufacturing files
is reminiscent of the earlier years of software development. In that
context, then-professor Stephen Breyer argued cogently that copyright
protection was not necessarily needed simply because there was a large
difference between the cost of producing an initial work and the cost of
copying it.279 He showed that most application programs were tailored
to individual customer needs, allowing for direct relationships and
diminishing the chances that third parties would even want to copy the
programs. 280 In fact, Pam Samuelson points out that most software sold
in the modern era is either developed in-house or for custom uses. 281
The same is true for many complex digital manufacturing files. A file for
a Ford Taurus engine will likely not be much help to General Motors.
Breyer also noted that many programs were sold as packages that
came with documentation and promises for continued services and
updates, allowing the seller to profit from an ongoing relationship based
on its expertise. 282 Digital manufacturing technology allows companies
continuously to update their products in response to technological
enhancements or changes in market demands. As a result, sellers of
digital manufacturing files may enjoy similar long-term relationships
with their buyers.
Even where computer programs were sold "off the shelf," Breyer
observed that where the buyers are relatively few in number, the seller

278 See, e.g., WERNER Z. HIRSCH, LAW AND ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 150-

51 (2d ed. 1984).
279 Breyer, supra note 211, at 344. As an initial matter, Breyer pointed out that the software
industry had flourished without software protection. Id.
280

Id. at 345.

Samuelson, Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 1777 ("[S]eventy percent of the total
investment in the development of software in the United States in the early twenty-first century
is either custom-developed software or software that firms develop for their internal uses.").
282 Breyer, supra note 211, at 345.
281
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could recoup its development costs by charging high prices.283 The same
can be true for many digital manufacturing files. If the seller creates the
file especially for a single or small group of buyers, pricing the sales to
recoup the costs is relatively straightforward.
Digital manufacturing files differ from traditional software because
the file creator can keep the file in-house and sell only the physical
embodiment of the device.284 The added control of keeping the file inhouse decreases the need for legal protections.285 Decreases, but not
eliminates. Buyers will often be able to reverse engineer physical parts
cheaply using 3D scanners, which can scan the object and generate a
digital manufacturing file based on the scan. 28 6
Like with software, many companies will develop digital files for
internal use. 287 These files' specificity limits the need for IP controls if
they would be useless outside of the company. Even where the files
might be valuable to others, contractual provisions forbidding
employees to disclose company files will provide protection.
The need to protect confidential company information raises a
protection mechanism that will complement private ordering: trade
secrets. Complex files provide a better fit for trade secret protection
because they (and the devices they print) are not susceptible to
immediate and effortless reverse engineering. Complex devices are
quintessential subjects for trade secret protection.288 Trade secrets,
therefore, can provide a good protective mechanism in appropriate
circumstances.289
Finally, TPMs can provide an additional layer of protection for
files. 290 Although they are not foolproof, they can prevent less
sophisticated parties from using files in ways against the seller's wishes.
They will play an important role in those complex files that are
distributed to a wider audience.
Id. at 346.
Software (and even hardware) can now be delivered as a service from the cloud in a
manner analogous to selling only a finished product. See Osborn et al., supra note 10, at 11981200.
285 Samuelson, Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 1779 (stating, in the cloud computing context,
"[i]f no one but the developer of such software ever has access to a machine-executable form of
the program, copyright protection is arguably unnecessary").
286 See, e.g., Capture, 3D SYSTEMS, http://www.geomagic.com/en/products/capture/overview
(last visited Mar. 8, 2018). Although some devices, such as those with many internal moving
parts, are not easily scanned.
287 See Samuelson, Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 1777 n.241 (stating that thirty-six percent of
software expenditures were for internal company uses).
288 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991)
(involving printing press parts, including drawings of the same).
289 Trade secrets are susceptible to reverse engineering. Regarding this possibility and the
ability of parties to contract around it, see supra notes 242-44 and accompanying text.
290 See supra notes 185-88 and accompanying text (discussing TPMs).
283
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In sum, complex digital files for purely utilitarian objects do not
provide a strong case for copyright protection. Patents, trade secrets,
contracts, and TPMs provide a web of protections for many of these
files. This conclusion is bolstered by the existence of a robust "open
hardware" movement. 291 The free, open-source hardware movement
"provides the code for hardware, including the bill of materials,
schematics, instructions, computer-aided drafting ('CAD') designs, and
other information needed to recreate a physical artifact."292 That people

are willing to develop and provide these files for free supports the
conclusion that strong copyright protections are not needed to provide
adequate incentives to create.293
B.

DigitalFilesfor Application Software

This Section turns from digital manufacturing files to a subset of
application software-relatively simple programs that perform purely
utilitarian functions.294 An example is a pinch-to-zoom feature for a
smart phone. In addition to the character of the program, the manner in
which the program is written is considered. Specifically, this Section
considers how new modularized programming environments impact IP
protection and channeling.
The debate about the appropriate protection regime for software
has existed for decades, and only so much can be added to what has
already been said.295 Although protecting utilitarian software with
copyright is often a mismatch given such software's overwhelming
utilitarian features, for a time it seemed the debate had reached
somewhat of a d6tente in the courts.

296

291 See, e.g., Rhys Jones et al., RepRap-the ReplicatingRapid Prototyper, 29 ROBOTICA 177,
177 (2011); Fisher & Gould, supra note 215, at 8-9; Pearce, supranote 215, at 1303-04.
292 Osborn et al., supra note 10, at 1202-03.
293 Ironically, the lack of copyright protection for digital manufacturing files may upset
assumptions of the open hardware movement. Like open source software, open hardware
licenses purport to control downstream users' rights with respect to the files. They may, for
instance, require attribution or prohibit commercialization. These licenses rely on copyright
law to provide "teeth" to the agreement. One who breaks the contract can become a copyright
infringer, which often gives rise to much larger damages. See Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373,
1380 (Fed. Cir. 2008). In addition, the presence of a copyright assuages some of the concerns
with servitudes.
294 Excluded from analysis are programs that contain creative audiovisual output, because
they will enjoy copyright protection.
295 See, e.g., Menell, supra note 30 (arguing for sui generis protection for programs); Oddi,
supra note 30 (arguing that programs should be protected by patent law, not copyright law);
Samuelson et al., supra note 30 (critiquing copyright protection of software and arguing for sui
generis protection for programs).
296 See Samuelson, Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 1775 (noting that "software copyright law
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Granting the creator a copyright for her life plus an additional
seventy years always appeared disproportionate to the effort involved,
much less the creativity. Nevertheless, copyright protection was
tolerated in large part because it only protects programs against one
who directly copies the code, or in some cases the organization. A
competitor is free to create a copycat program from scratch that
implements all of the program's utilitarian features. Thus, in essence,
copyright law only gives developers a lead-time advantage over
competitors who, in the absence of copyright prohibitions, could copy
the software instantly. Additionally, software protection was clearly
"thin," filtering out functional design elements and protecting only
against verbatim code copying and certain golden nuggets of creative
overall design.297
Indeed, software came to enjoy not only copyright protection, but
also other forms of IP protection. Rather than channeling a work to one
regime, multiple regimes covered different aspects. 298 Courts began
openly permitting patents for software after the Supreme Court upheld
a patent for a software-implemented invention in Diamond v. Diehr.299
Courts also allowed trade secret protection for mass-distributed
software because the seller only released the unintelligible (to humans)
object code, which is difficult to reverse-engineer.3 00
Whatever calm may have been reached was temporary, however.
Software patents are under attack after Alice.301 In the copyright context,
the Federal Circuit recently bucked the trend of other circuits and
granted copyright protection to seemingly functional aspects of
software.302 Simultaneously, commentators have redoubled the attacks
on the desirability of software copyrights.303

stabilized" toward the end of the twentieth century).
297 See Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 710 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Once a
court has sifted out all elements of the allegedly infringed program which are 'ideas' or are
dictated by efficiency or external factors, or taken from the public domain, there may remain a
core of protectable expression. In terms of a work's copyright value, this is the golden nugget.").
298 See Pamela Samuelson, Strategiesfor Discerningthe Boundaries of Copyright and Patent
Protections, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1493, 1517-21 (2017) (discussing the "segmentation
approach" in which different IP regimes protect different aspects of a work).
299 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
300 See, e.g., Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F. Supp. 340, 359 (D.
Mass. 1993); Q-Co Indus. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
301 Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (holding that a
method of intermediated settlement was not patent eligible even if computer implemented); see
supra notes 134-39 and accompanying text (discussing the decision's effects on software
patents).
302 Oracle Am., Inc. v. Google Inc., 750 F.3d 1339, 1356-64 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (finding Oracle's
declaring code to constitute copyrightable subject matter unaffected by merger or scenes a
faire).
303 See Samuelson, Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 1775-81.
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Into this melee step two features involved in many modern
programs that are the focus here: simple programs performing purely
utilitarian functions and simple programs created using modularized
programming environments. A given program may contain one or both
of these features, and each will be addressed in turn.
As I use the term, simple programs refer to those that a
programmer can create in a relatively short time, from a few hours to a
few days. By definition, these programs do not require much effort, and
thus need proportionally less incentive in the form of IP or other
protection. The points of analysis here largely mirror those for relatively
simple digital manufacturing files, though two exceptions to the
comparison deserve mention. First, program files are slightly harder to
copy than digital manufacturing files because many lay users will not
know where to find the appropriate files on their phones or computers.
Second, courts will perceive these program files to be like traditionally
copyrighted software, and thus inertia will incline them to grant
copyright protection. Even so, copyright, which is a poor fit doctrinally
and theoretically, is not needed if other appropriability mechanisms
provide adequate incentives.304
A second feature that impacts copyrightability is the presence of
modularized programming environments. Programmers have long been
able to call on certain subroutines, but newer environments have greatly
simplified the coding process. These environments allow users to avoid
directly typing virtually any code for some programs. Instead, they select
icons that visually represent functions they want to implement, and then
simply supply certain parameters to complete the "code." For instance,
if I wanted to create a pop-up window for a smart phone, I would select
the desired window and simply add the text that I want to appear in the
box. This is similar to drawing in a CAD environment: the CAD file
creator typically does not type any code directly. Rather, he draws a
picture, which the software translates into code.
The modularized coding interface abstracts the coding practice,
removing it one or more levels from the literal code. Because courts
emphasize that software copyrights most clearly protect the literal code
typed by the user, abstracting the code raises immediate questions as to
whether any protectable expression remains.305 It is of course possible
for the structure, sequence, and organization of a program to garner
copyright protection, but only if it includes a modicum of creativity that

304 See supra notes 84-100 and accompanying text (discussing copyright protection).
305 See Comput. Assocs. Int'l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 703-12 (2d Cir. 1992) (assuming
that the literal code, which the programmer drafted, was protectable and implementing an
abstraction-filtration-comparison test to test what else, if anything, was protectable).
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does not merge with the expression. 306 For relatively short programs,
there may be no such creativity. This requires a case-by-case analysis,
but the important point is that copyright may not provide protection,
something courts have been hesitant to recognize in relation to
software.307
If copyright protection is not available, one must next analyze
whether other IP laws provide protection. Whether utility patents 3 os will
be available to those programs that are novel and nonobvious is not
clear in the wake of Alice. Assuming the programs are truly nonobvious,
patent protection would seem at first blush to be a natural fit. Yet, it
may be that the Supreme Court has implicitly decided that the effort
required to create many software inventions does not need patent law's
strong incentive.3 09 If software inventions do not require much effort to
create and commercialize, then patents may harm innovation by
slowing dissemination and follow-on innovation. 310 Thus, the case for
patents for these programs is ambivalent.
Courts almost universally recognize trade secret protection in favor
of the source code for computer programs distributed in object code
form.311 Although the source code can be a trade secret, the object code

cannot when it is widely distributed.312 Thus, when a creator widely
distributes its program in object code format, it loses trade secret
protection for the object code. And if the object code is not a trade
secret, a third party can use and distribute it without misappropriating a
trade secret, even if the related source code is a trade secret. 313 Hence,
See, e.g., id.
See supra note 32.
308 Design patents will not be available where the software has no ornamental output. 35
U.S.C. § 171 (2012) (requiring the design to be "ornamental").
309 See Osborn et al., supra note 10, at 1250 (positing that the Supreme Court targeted
software patents in part from a belief that the inventions do not require the patent incentive).
310 See id. at 1225 (noting the harmful effects of patents); see also Robert P. Merges
Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 870
(1990) ("[B]road patents could discourage much useful research.").
311 See, e.g., Q-Co Indus. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (recognizing
trade secret protection for source code and stating, "[t]he source code of the VPS-500 program
is not accessible to the public").
312 See, e.g., Trandes Corp. v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 996 F.2d 655, 663 n.8 (4th Cir. 1993) ("In
[normal] cases, the owner of the software cannot claim trade secret protection for the object
code because its disclosure to the public destroyed its secrecy."); Q-Co Indus., 625 F. Supp. at
617 ("Only the object code is publically available. . . ."); Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F.
Supp. 1471, 1476 (D. Nev. 1983) ("[W]here such a computer program is made readily available
to the public such as ... here, its contents may not be deemed a trade secret unless access to it is
actually treated as a secret . . . .").
313 See Beacon Wireless Sols., Inc. v. Garmin Int'l, Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 727, 733 (W.D. Va.
2012) (holding that because the defendants did not have access to the relevant technical details,
"the defendants did not use or otherwise misappropriate these technical details when they
utilized the plaintiffs' telematics hardware to test and develop the interface specifications and
306

&
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trade secret protection for uncopyrighted software is sometimes very
weak. A third party can costlessly copy the object code and make it
immediately available to others.314 Normally, copyright law provides
protection against copying the object code, but this Article has posited
that no copyright protection will be available.
Here again, sellers can attempt to contract around the absence of
copyright protection and the weakness of trade secrets. The seller can
insist on a contract term that prohibits transferees from copying,
distributing, and reverse engineering the object code. The tradeoffs and
points of contention here are similar to those discussed with respect to
digital manufacturing files, and thus will not be reiterated.315 In short,
contractual terms will typically bind directly negotiating parties and
may sometimes bind downstream parties who have notice of the terms.
Anywhere along the chain of distribution, however, the terms may be
stripped out, and downstream recipients on the notice-free programs
will likely not be bound by contract. Thus, contractual provisions can
provide a developer with lead-time advantage, which in many cases will
be sufficient to recoup the modest investment poured into the
program's creation. Further, contract remedies may be available for
parties who breach the terms.
A few other dynamics of software, relevant to simple and complex
programs alike, deserve mention. The ability to deliver software as a
service helps users to maintain additional control.316 As with digital

manufacturing files, TPMs play a role in slowing the advent of copycat
programs and can help identify those who breach contractual terms. 317
Finally, empirical evidence suggests that copyrights are not highly
important to many software businesses. For instance, high technology
entrepreneurs rated copyright protection as between slightly and
moderately important in securing competitive advantage from their
technology innovations.318 Where the user spends little time and money
the software resident on the [devices]"); Silvaco Data Sys. v. Intel Corp., 109 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 34
(Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that "[o]ne does not, by executing machine-readable software,
'use' the underlying source code; nor does one acquire the requisite knowledge of any trade
secrets embodied in that code").
314 If needed or desired, third parties can also reverse engineer the source code, though this
is expensive and time-consuming. See Samuelson & Scotchmer, supra note 195, at 1613.
315 See supra text accompanying notes 242-73 (discussing protection by contract).
316 See Samuelson, Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 1779 ("If no one but the developer of such
software ever has access to a machine-executable form of the program, copyright protection is
arguably unnecessary.").
317 Id. at 1780.
318 See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1289-90 (2009). They
rated first-mover advantage most highly. Copyrights were roughly equal to other methods such
as secrecy, trademarks, and complimentary assets, and were more important than patents. Id. It
is possible that copyright and other mechanisms are more important to software companies
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creating a program, the need for strong protections is even less than for
traditional startups. 319
In sum, simple software programs may not require strong
copyright or patent protections. One obvious difficulty becomes where
to draw the line between "relatively simple" programs, which do not get
copyright protection, and more complex ones, which do. We draw this
line in other contexts, including literary texts, 320 and there is no reason
we cannot do the same with software programs.
C.

Files ContainingLockout Codes

If the previous analysis convinces courts to eschew granting
copyright protection to purely utilitarian files, it is not unreasonable to
expect that some creators will search for ways to obtain copyright
protection. As mentioned, creators may try to append extraneous
material, such as nonexecutable comments or creative images within the
files.321 This material would pose no purpose other than to attempt to
garner copyright protection for otherwise uncopyrightable files. It
would thus serve as a type of lockout code.322

Granting copyright protection for purely utilitarian files based on
lockout codes raises concern that copyright law is trammeling on the
province of patent law. The patent system "embodies a carefully crafted
bargain for encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and
nonobvious advances in technology and design in return for the
exclusive right to practice the invention for a period of years."323
Allowing creators to hijack copyright law to protect files of purely
utilitarian objects would upset the carefully crafted patent system. 324

after the Supreme Court weakened patent protection in the area.
319 Note, however, that sellers of mass-marketed software continue to rely on copyright to
battle copycats. See Samuelson, Uneasy Case, supra note 1, at 1781 n.268. Where programs
require more upfront investment, stronger protection will be needed to incentivize creation.
But IP protections can also overprotect, and one would expect self-interested businesses to
leverage IP even after they have made the necessary profit to incentivize continued creation.
320 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (determining
that instructional text for a sweepstakes entry did not enjoy copyright protection).
321 See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
322 See supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
323 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
324 Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526 (9th Cir. 1992) ("If disassembly of
copyrighted object code is per se an unfair use, the owner of the copyright gains a de facto
monopoly over the functional aspects of his work-aspects that were expressly denied
copyright protection by Congress. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). In order to enjoy a lawful monopoly over
the idea or functional principle underlying a work, the creator of the work must satisfy the
more stringent standards imposed by the patent laws."); Moffat, supra note 202, at 612
("Delineating the boundary between copyright and patent law is thus fundamentally important
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Courts should thus refuse to provide copyright protection for
lockout codes in this context. Preferably, courts faced with lockout
codes would find as a matter of law that the expression merges with its
function.325 This approach provides a bright-line rule that minimizes
uncertainty and litigation expenses by allowing a defendant a clear and
quick defense. It thus frees downstream users to utilize and build off of
utilitarian files without fear of copyright repercussions, enhancing the
public's benefit from technological use and development. In contrast,
fair use or misuse would require a more searching inquiry and provide
less certainty ex ante. 3 26

That being said, courts may sometimes have difficulty determining
whether comments in a file's code are being used purely as lockout
codes or are instead good faith attempts to educate downstream users of
certain file features.327 If the comment is a poem, chances are it was
placed there as a lockout code. But a shrewd creator might include stepby-step comments in his file that look to be (and may be) informative,
but subjectively intend them to act solely as a lockout code.
Given the difficulty in ascertaining the intent behind a file's extra
content, courts may have to engage in the sometimes difficult task of
distinguishing between legitimate content and mere lockout codes.
Industry customs can help. The author's discussions with various 3D
printing specialists reveal that creators of design files (e.g., CAD or
DWG) often contain genuine explanatory text for future users, along
with other extraneous material. On the other hand, it is extremely rare
for such comments to exist in manufacturing-ready (STL) or machineinstruction (GCODE) files, not least because the translation software
strips such material from design files during conversion.328 The general
lack of comments in manufacturing-ready files is important because
that is the format most often used when sharing files.
Current practices notwithstanding, users desiring control will look
to insert potentially copyrightable material in their files, but courts
cannot read minds to decipher intent. Thus, courts should institute
rules that ensure copyright law will not prevent access to the purely
to the federal intellectual property regime and to the goals of the patent system in particular.").
325 See Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 544 (6th Cir.
2004) ("[A] poem in the abstract could be copyrightable. But that does not mean that the poem
receives copyright protection when it is used in the context of a lock-out code.").
326 See supra notes 111-21 (discussing fair use and misuse). Misuse can have an important
role in egregious cases because misuse (until purged) can render the copyright unenforceable
against the public, providing further certainty ex ante. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds,
911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990).
327 Cf Fromer, supra note 192, at 590-92 (noting the difficulty in ascertaining motives and
offering alternative options).
328 A user could go into a STL or GCODE file and add comments if desired, as shown in Part
I.
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utilitarian aspects of the files. One option is simply to ignore the
copying of comments altogether. Another is to use the more
individualized fair use analysis.329 A drawback of fair use is the casespecific, indeterminate nature of the analysis, which fails to provide ex
ante certainty. Fear of liability or litigation costs may deter otherwise
permissible uses. Hence, to protect the proper roles of copyright and
patent law, courts applying fair use should consistently find uses are
presumptively fair. A copyright claimant could rebut the presumption
upon showing the defendant obtained a material benefit from the
nonexecutable material. To minimize costs and uncertainty, courts
should make the fair use determination in these types of cases as early as
possible during litigation.
Although this Article is aggressive against lockout codes, there is a
distinction between the lockout codes discussed herein and those
familiar from cases like Lexmark.330 In traditional lockout code cases,
the defendant circumvented the lockout code to obtain interoperability
with an unprotected system. The defendant used the interoperability to
create independently made works, such as new video games (Sega) or
printer cartridges (Lexmark). The defendant thus may have appealed to
the courts' consciences as industrious firms fostering independent
creativity or production.
In contrast, with digital files, the defendant may simply be copying
the file to use it verbatim. For example, if I have access to your file that
prints an engine part, I might use it simply to print the part, not to make
my own add-on part. This is a distinction without consequence. Though
the direct copier is perhaps not as sympathetic as the follow-on
innovator, copying is at the core of a competitive economy. "In general,
unless an intellectual property right such as a patent or copyright
protects an item, it will be subject to copying."331 Pejorative labels, such
as "lazy copier," betray a normative assessment that is at odds with the
prevailing view in free markets, which is that "free exploitation of ideas
will be the rule, to which the protection of a federal patent [or other IP]
is the exception."332 Courts may miss this point because the files
themselves, and the physical objects they may manufacture, are not
typically subject to free copying like ideas and business strategies. But
they should realize that the digital era is maturing to the point where
earlier practices decrease in salience.
329 See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text (discussing fair use).
330 Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 544.
331 TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29 (2001).
332 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989). See generally
Mark. A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REv. 1031 (2005)
(arguing against overprotective intellectual property laws).
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Besides, some who copy the files will make improvements, either to
the files directly or using the files as tools to perform other meaningful
tasks. Though not a necessary condition to the permissible copying of
utilitarian files, the possibility of downstream improvements provides
further justification.
CONCLUSION

This Article provides doctrinal clarity and theoretical depth to how
courts should approach IP protection and channeling for digital files.
Although the law correctly channels many files, such as songs and
movies into copyright protection, an increasing number of files do not
belong under copyright's umbrella. Instead, other appropriation
mechanisms, including lead time, contracts, and TPM, will provide
sufficient incentives. Courts will have difficulty seeing this because of an
historical tendency to push digital works into copyright. But it is
important that they do see it; innovation rates depend on it.

